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UNDER FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES:
INCOME FROM HUMAN CAPITAL, REALIZATION,
AND NONRECOGNITION
MARY L. HEEN*
The taxation of employment discrimination recoveries under
federal civil rights statutes, according to the United States
Supreme Court's pronouncement in United States v. Burke, turns
on whether a particular claim is sufficiently "tort-like" to war-
rant exclusion from income as a personal injury. In place of the
"tort-like" standard, Professor Mary L Heen offers a human
capital approach that she believes is both more responsive to the
goals of the civil rights statutes at issue and more consistent with
income tax policy.
Like personal injuries in tort, injuries caused by employment
discrimination diminish an individual's human capital-they are
just as surely "personal" losses. Thus, Professor Heen posits
that employment discrimination awards should be taxed like per-
sonal injury awards, i.e., excluded from income under § 104(a)(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code. Professor Heen first discusses the
implications-both in theory and in practice-for tax and em-
ployment law raised by the taxation of employment discrimination
awards. Next she analyzes the development of the law, culminat-
ing in a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Burke. Professor Heen then sets out a human capital approach
in replacement of Burke's tort-like standard.
Professor Heen concludes that economic recoveries such as
back pay should be excluded from income as compensation for
injury to human capital, and that back pay should be computed
net of taxes at the remedial stage of the civil rights action.
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Noneconomic recoveries such as damages for pain and suffering
should also be excluded, just as they are in the tort context. Puni-
tive damages should be included in income, because they are not
intended as compensation for the victim of discrimination. In ad-
dition to its theoretical consistency with tax and civil rights law,
the human capital approach would be much easier to administer
and would yield more predictable results.
I. INTRODUCTION
The taxation of employment discrimination awards and settlements
raises fundamental policy questions about the exclusion from gross income
of damages received on account of personal injuries,1 the nature of recov-
eries under various federal civil rights statutes,2 and the proper taxation of
human capital.' Although United States v. Burke4 presented the United
States Supreme Court with an opportunity to address some of these issues,
the Court ruled very narrowly.5 The decision in Burke leaves many techni-
1. The exclusion from gross income for personal injury damages is provided by § 104(a)(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. It provides in relevant part that "gross income
does not include the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether
as lump sums or periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
The regulations define the term "damages received" as "an amount received... through
prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement
agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution." Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1993).
2. This Article focuses on several federal civil rights statutes prohibiting discrimination in
employment, primarily Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1988), but also the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1988), the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. HI 1991), and employment-related
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1988).
3. Human capital investments have been defined as "activities that influence future mone-
tary and psychic income by increasing resources in people." GARY S. BEcxna, HUMAN CAPrrAL:
A TrmOnnCA. AND EMPwRCAL ANALYsIs, WrrH SPECiAL REFERINCE TO EDUCAION 9 (2d ed.
1975). Human capital is a product of birth and social inheritance, is increased by education,
health care, migration, and on-the-job training, and is affected by factors such as opportunities and
social and technological changes. Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income Taxation and Human
Capital, 70 VA. L. RLv. 1357, 1358-59 (1984). It has been defined in economic terms as "the
present value of the flow of future satisfactions that an individual can command in the course of
his [or her] life." Id. at 1358 (citing economic literature).
4. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
5. In Burke, the Court only partially decided the threshold statutory issue of whether the
exclusion for personal injury damages reaches such civil rights recoveries. The Court held that a
payment received in settlement of a back pay claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was not excludable from the recipient's gross income under § 104(a)(2) of the Code as
"'damages received ... on account of personal injuries."' 112 S. Ct. at 1874 (quoting I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993)). The Court noted that "neither the text nor the legislative history
of § 104(a)(2) offer[ed] any explanation of the term 'personal injuries.'" Id. at 1870. The IRS
regulations, however, "linked identification of a personal injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2) to
traditional tort principles." Id. Relying on the remedial scheme of Title VII as it existed prior to
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cal issues unanswered; much therefore remains for clarification and devel-
opment by the lower courts.6 More significantly, however, the Court
declined an opportunity to bring greater theoretical coherence and rational-
ity to a difficult area of federal income tax law.
This Article considers whether the exclusion for personal injury dam-
ages ought to encompass employment-related civil rights awards and settle-
ments-an inquiry more comprehensive than the statutory issue decided in
Burke. That question relates to the fundamental issue of whether the exclu-
sion for damages received on account of personal injuries provided by
§ 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") of 1986, as
amended,7 makes sense as a matter of policy. The policy basis for
§ 104(a)(2) has been much debated. This Article will not revisit that
ground, other than to use the debate concerning § 104(a)(2) as a framework
for considering the more specific question of the section's application in the
employment discrimination context.'
Personal injury suits typically include claims for compensatory dam-
ages such as medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, and lost fu-
ture earnings due to impairment of earning capacity; they also may include
claims for punitive damages. 9 It is well established that all compensatory
damages for physical injuries, including any lost past or future wages re-
sulting from such injuries," are excludable from the victim's gross income
under § 104(a)(2). The tax treatment of punitive damages for personal inju-
ries,'1 and of compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries such as libel
or defamation, malicious prosecution, or employment discrimination, has
been more problematic.' 2 With regard to nonphysical injuries, the Internal
Revenue Service (the "Service") has argued that recovery for these injuries
or damages ought not to be excluded from gross income because they are
actually economic or business-related rather than "personal."' 3 The courts
have rejected the government's personal/business distinction in cases in-
amendments adopted by Congress in 1991, the Court held that back pay awards in certain Title
VII employment discrimination cases are not excludable from gross income as damages received
on account of a "personal injury." Id. at 1873-74. Thus, the statutory construction issue has been
decided by the Court only with regard to back pay awards under the pre-amended version of Title
VII applicable in Burke.
6. See infra notes 265-97 and accompanying text.
7. See supra note 1 for the text of § 104(a)(2).
8. See infra notes 57-94 and accompanying text.
9. E.g., DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON Tim LAw OF REMEmDms 540-90 (1973); JACoB A.
STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INmRY DAMAGES (2d ed. 1991).
10. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14.
11. See infra notes 214-18, 277-85 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 159-212 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
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volving defamation14 and malicious prosecution i" and have looked instead
to the "nature of the claim" asserted." If the claim relates to an injury that
is personal in nature, the loss of income resulting from the injury is exclud-
able under § 104(a)(2).
In Burke, the Court considered these issues in the context of an em-
ployment discrimination claim. Some of the most troubling tax questions
with regard to employment discrimination cases concern the treatment of
back pay recoveries 7 or compensation for injuries measured by lost past or
future wages.18 The Court held in Burke that amounts paid in settlement of
sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,19 as applied prior to amendment by the Civil Rights Act of
1991,20 are not excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2). 2 The
Court rejected application of the personal/business distinction to an employ-
ment discrimination claim and adopted instead the "nature of the claim"
test.22 The Court then analyzed Title VII's remedial scheme to determine
whether the Title VII claim was sufficiently "tort-like" to constitute a per-
sonal injury action. Because the remedial scheme provided for back pay
and injunctive relief but not other compensatory or punitive damages, the
Court concluded that Title VII actions are not sufficiently "tort-like" to war-
14. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983).
15. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988).
16. See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
17. For discussion of back pay as a remedy provided under federal statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment, see infra notes 111-19, 123 and accompanying text.
18. For example, recoveries measured by lost wages may be awarded to successful claimants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or § 1983. E.g., Johnson v. Chapel Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 853 F.2d 375,
383 (5th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876, 885 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 391 (1977). For pre-Burke cases discussing the tax consequences of
such awards, see Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 871-75 (10th Cir. 1989); Bent v. Com-
missioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987). For a discussion of employment discrimination claims
asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, see infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
19. Under Title VII, it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C,
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). In addition, it is an "unlawful employment practice" for an employer "to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee [because of] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
§ 2000e-2(a)(2). Title VII also prohibits unlawful discrimination by employment agencies, id.
§ 2000e-2(b), and unions, id. § 2000e-2(c).
20. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The Burke majority suggested in a footnote
that its decision did not reach the tax treatment of awards under the more expansive version of
Title VII's remedial scope adopted by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and thus the
Court was not addressing the statutory construction issue regarding employment discrimination
awards or settlements under the amended version of Title VII. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct.
1867, 1874 n.12 (1992).
21. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874.
22. Id. at 1872.
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rant exclusion from gross income of back pay received by victims of
discrimination.23
Regardless of the Court's statutory construction of § 104(a)(2) in
Burke, troublesome theoretical questions underlying the application of the
exclusion remain. This Article explores some of the theoretical issues and
practical problems raised by the taxation of employment discrimination re-
coveries. The Article pays particular attention to lost past and future earn-
ings and suggests an analysis that differs from the "tort-like" standard
applied by the Court in Burke. Under the "tort-like" standard, post-Burke
litigation focuses on technical examination of the statutory remedies avail-
able under federal employment discrimination laws, making the tax result
turn on tort/contract distinctions. Those distinctions are quite difficult to
discern, however, especially when evaluating the various federal antidis-
crimination statutes. The tax result should instead depend upon a theory
more compatible with the purpose of the antidiscrimination statutes and
with income tax policy. A theory focusing on the taxation of human capital
offers such an alternative approach.
The human capital approach offers insight into the appropriate tax re-
sult because it addresses the theoretical issues raised by § 104(a)(2) and
their application to employment discrimination recoveries. Compensation
received for bodily injuries (including earnings lost as a result of the inju-
ries), for example, raises questions concerning the proper taxation of human
capital recoveries. Similarly, in the employment discrimination context, the
appropriate inquiry is whether employment discrimination results in human
capital loss and whether the remedies provided by federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes compensate for that loss.2
An exploration of these issues requires closer consideration of the
proper taxation of human capital and the effects of antidiscrimination law
on human capital accumulation. Pure theory poses certain perils in this
context, however, because of the difficulty of distinguishing between the
"rules" and the "exceptions"-a problem well described by Professor Boris
Bittker.1 Responding to the suggestion that we should lean over backward
to avoid tax preferences,2 6 Professor Bittker observed that we cannot com-
ply because "in the absence of a generally acceptable or scientifically deter-
minable vertical, we cannot know whether we are leaning forward or
23. Id. at 1873-74.
24. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
25. Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARv. L. Rav. 925, 985 (1967).
26. Walter J. Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform-Twenty Questions, 41 TAxEs 672, 679
(1963) ('There is nothing about the combination of rate reduction and base broadening which
dictates that all preferential provisions be eliminated, but there are potent reasons for leaning over
backwards before allowing any of them to remain."); see infra note 59 (defining tax preferences).
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backward.' 2 7 That problem is particularly acute when trying to determine
the proper taxation of human capital.
Among other things, the realization requirement itself represents a de-
parture from the theoretically correct taxation of accretion to wealth (relat-
ing to either investment capital or human capital). In addition, the difficulty
of discerning the personal/business borderline, which is theoretically criti-
cal, but practically quite blurred, further complicates this inquiry. Because
no theoretically correct result is also practically feasible, any solution must
also consider the Code's "second best" approach to the taxation of human
capital.28
The alternative approach suggested here attempts to reconcile the taxa-
tion of employment discrimination recoveries with the Code's approach to
the taxation of human capital, the effects of employment discrimination on
human capital accumulation, and the tax treatment of personal injury recov-
eries under § 104(a)(2). The discussion of these issues is divided into the
next three parts. Part II discusses the theoretical and practical considera-
tions concerning the tax and employment law issues at stake.29 Part III
outlines the development of the law and includes a description of early ad-
ministrative interpretation, a summary of pre-Burke decisions applying
§ 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination cases, and a more detailed dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Burke. 0 After previewing
some of the post-Burke problems created by the Court's adoption of the
"tort-like" standard, the Article proposes that the standard be discarded.31
Part IV discusses an alternative approach, which applies a human capital
analysis to economic recoveries (such as back pay received by victims of
employment discrimination), and a compensatory versus noncompensatory
approach for noneconomic recoveries (such as recoveries for pain and suf-
fering and punitive damages).3 2 The Article concludes that employment
discrimination recoveries such as back pay and front pay33 should be ex-
cluded from income as compensation for human capital loss, a "personal"
injury, and that the recoveries should be computed on an after-tax basis at
the remedial stage of the civil rights action. Punitive damages, on the other
hand, serve noncompensatory functions such as deterrence and retribution.
Punitive damages should therefore be included in income.3 Damages for
27. Bittker, supra note 25, at 985.
28. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 35-143.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 144-263.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 264-304.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 305-29.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22 for a description of front pay.
34. As discussed infra at text accompanying notes 216-18 and notes 277-85, the tax treat-
ment of punitive damages for physical injuries is unsettled.
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pain and suffering or emotional distress should be excluded, as they are in
the tort context. This alternative human capital approach should be adopted
in place of the "tort-like" standard because it is more consistent with the
theoretical rationale of § 104(a)(2) and with the remedial purposes of fed-
eral antidiscrimination laws. It also results in greater uniformity and ease of
administration in the taxation of employment discrimination recoveries.
II. THE THEOREncAL DEBATE ABOUT THE EXCLUSION FOR PERSONAL
INJURY DAMAGES AND THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT DIscRIINATION
REMEDIEs: THE PRACncAL LIMITATIONS
The theoretical underpinnings of § 104(a)(2) should inform the stan-
dard for determining whether the exclusion applies in a given setting. As
described below, § 104(a)(2) has been most convincingly rationalized as
providing a somewhat imprecise mechanism for ensuring that personal in-
jury awards are taxed in a manner consistent with what would have oc-
curred under the Code if there had been no injury to human capital. That
approach provides a useful framework for considering the proper taxation
of employment discrimination recoveries.
This part of the Article compares the taxation of human capital and
investment capital, summarizes the policy debate concerning § 104(a)(2),
and examines employment discrimination recoveries to determine whether
they compensate for human capital loss. How civil rights law should rem-
edy the loss of human capital, if at all, has been the subject of vigorous
national debate."5 The debate most recently resulted in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which amended Title VII and various other employment discrimi-
nation statutes by broadening the relief available in certain types of cases.
An understanding of the remedial design of employment discrimina-
tion statutes is important for two purposes: (1) to analyze how employment
discrimination recoveries redress the loss of human capital caused by dis-
crimination, an inquiry relevant to the theory of how these recoveries
should be taxed, and (2) to understand the implications of the "tort-like"
standard adopted in Burke. Part II concludes with an example illustrating
Title VII claims and relief, which readers unfamiliar with the statute may
find helpful as background for the later discussion.
A. Comparing the Taxation of Human Capital and Investment Capital
In theory, an income tax system taxes income measured as personal
consumption plus the market value of the net change in wealth during the
35. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
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taxable period. 6 A model income tax taxes investment "twice": once,
when the investment asset is purchased with the taxpayer's after-tax earn-
ings; and again, when the investment incrementally increases in value or
generates additional earnings.37 The Code frequently departs from this
ideal, as exemplified by its general failure to tax the unrealized appreciation
of property and the imputed income from property or services. 38 For exam-
ple, because unrealized appreciation and imputed income improve a tax-
payer's economic position and therefore constitute "income" in an
economic sense, it has been suggested that taxing the market value of im-
puted income from owner-occupied housing and certain big-ticket con-
sumer durables, such as cars, may be desirable. 9 Problems of valuation,
administration, and the relative absence of significant economic distortions
(after taking into account offsetting deductions for maintenance and depre-
ciation, for example) counsel against the inclusion of most such imputed
income.' In many respects, therefore, the Code takes a "second best" ap-
proach to taxing income.
Similar considerations have militated against taxing increments of
human capital or the imputed income from such capital, such as increased
job satisfaction or security. Taxable income could include increments to
human capital, assuming they could be identified and valued. For example,
attending vocational school may increase the lifetime earning capacity of a
high school graduate wishing to become a mechanic. The increase in
human capital produced by her training, measured by the present value of
her future earnings as a mechanic (as compared to the present value of her
future earnings without such training, e.g., as a fast-food clerk), constitutes
income during her school years, just as if she owned stocks or bonds that
36. This idealized version of an income tax system derives from the Haig-Simons concept of
income. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INcoME TAXATION 50 (1938) ("Personal income may be
defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question."); Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FED.
ERAL INcoME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921) reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS'N, READINOS iN
THE ECONOMICS oF TAXAIOnN 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959) ("Income is
the money value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two points of time.").
37. See infra text accompanying notes 50, 55-56.
38. Imputed income includes, for example, the market value of services a taxpayer performs
for himself, such as cooking a meal or sweeping a floor, and the value of leisure time, such as
reading a novel or going to a concert. See SIMONS, supra note 36, at 52 (explaining that leisure
income could be imputed to persons "according to what they might earn per hour if otherwise
engaged"). It also includes the annual rental value of property owned by the taxpayer, such as the
house she lives in or the toaster, car, and lawn mower she uses during the year. See DEPARTMENT'
oF TmE TREAsuRY, BLUEPmS FOR BAsic TAX REFoRM 7, 89 (1977) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS].
39. BLuEpRunrs, supra note 38, at 7, 85-89; see also Bittker, supra note 25, at 947-48 (dis-
cussing imputed income from taxpayer's assets).
40. BLUEPRNTS, supra note 38, at 7; Bittker, supra note 25, at 948.
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increased in value by a similar amount during the same time. Like the
appreciation in the value of the stocks or bonds, the increase in value of
human capital constitutes economic gain even though it is not realized.
Under the current Code, the gain from the securities generally will not be
taxed unless realized through a sale or exchange.41 Similarly, the gain from
the increment in human capital will not be taxed until realized in the form
of wages.42
The major difference between human capital and investment capital,
however, is that although the securities can be sold or exchanged, human
capital and the imputed income from it are inherently personal. Human
capital cannot be transferred except in the form of one taxpayer providing
services to another.43 The personal nature of human capital creates special
valuation issues for income tax purposes and also raises independent con-
cerns about individual liberty and autonomy. These problems raise serious
theoretical obstacles to taxing human capital like other investment capital.
Under current law, human capital is not taxed as an investment asset
with basis,' although in the abstract, it could be so treated. The present
discounted value of future wage-earning capacity could be included in in-
come as it is acquired and the basis resulting from such inclusions could be
41. I.R.C. § 1001, 61(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993). Exceptions apply in certain specialized con-
texts. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 475 (applying mark-to-market accounting method for dealers in securi-
ties); I.R.C. § 1256 (requiring that certain regulated futures contracts, foreign currency contracts,
and nonequity and dealer equity options be marked to market).
42. Gross income includes "compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe
benefits, and similar items." Id. § 61(a)(1).
43. 1 Bomis I. BrrrTTK & LAwRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND Gurs 3.5.2 (2d ed. 1989). Even human capital transfer in the form of an exchange of
services is subject to significant limitations compared to the legal treatment of more traditional
property rights. For a recent discussion of restrictions on the alienability of human capital in the
employment context, see Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L.
REv. 383, 386-412 (1993) (discussing existing doctrinal limitations on enforceability of assign-
ments of human capital and arguing for fewer restrictions).
44. The basis of an investment asset, generally speaking, is the cost of the asset. I.R.C.
§ 1012 (West Supp. 1993). When the asset is sold, any excess of the amount realized over the
adjusted basis of the asset is "gain," id. § 1001(a), which is includable in gross income under
§ 61(a)(3). The cost basis of human capital would be quite difficult to determine, and thus is
generally ignored. See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CoiRNE, L. REv. 143, 152-55
(1992). For criticism of current law, see David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital:
Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. Rns. L. Rev. 793, 796-802
(1992) [hereinafter Education and Human Capital]; David S. Davenport, The "Proper" Taxation
of Human Capital, 52 TAX NoTEs 1401, 1401-11 (1991); Brian E. Lebowitz, On the Mistaxation
ofInvestment in Human Capital, 52 TAX NoTEs 825, 825-31 (1991); John K. McNulty, Tax Policy
and Tuition Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher
Education, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1, 16-36 (1973); see also Loretta C. Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher
Education Expenditures: An Unfair Investment Disincentive, 41 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 621, 622-27
(1990) (urging allowance of recovery for post-secondary education expenditures); John J. Mylan,
Current Tax Treatment of Education Costs, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 387, 408-13 (1980) (discussing the
amortization of educational expenses).
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amortized against actual wages earned.4 5 Liquidity problems could be ad-
dressed by deferring tax with interest until the earnings are received by the
taxpayer.46 Taxing such human capital increments would result in over-
whelming definitional and valuation problems,47 however, and would en-
tangle us in weighty discussions over the moral and philosophical
advisability of attempting to define and measure unrealized earning poten-
tial.4 8 Thus, the income tax model of taxing investments twice may not be
appropriate for human capital.
In any event, regardless of whether the Code is making a principled
departure from the income tax model for human capital investments or sim-
ply taking a "second-best" approach when the model poses certain practical
difficulties, the Code ignores human capital increases (the present value of
increased future earning capacity). Generally speaking, it also ignores their
cost recovery (either by way of a current deduction or by amortizing or
depreciating vocational or professional school tuition and fees).4 9 The
Code taxes the wages only when received (with no basis offset)-in short,
only the realized income from the human capital investment is taxed. In
45. 1 Brrrxiax & LoKKEmN, supra note 43, at 3.5.2.; Dodge, supra note 44, at 153.
46. William A. Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STU. 461, 466-67 (1977).
47. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1145-46 (1974) (discussing the practical difficulty of isolating changes in
human wealth from changes in comprehensive material wealth). See also Mary L. Fellows, A
Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 Mici. L. Rav. 722, 780-83 (1990) (discussing the
difficulties of applying a time-adjusted realization event tax to human capital).
48. See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an
"Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. Rnv. 831,
841-44 (1979); Klein, supra note 46, at 468-69. Some commentators have suggested middle
ground solutions. For example, Professor McNulty has proposed permitting a fixed amount of
after-tax foregone earnings to be treated as recoverable costs, based on average or median incomes
of school-aged persons and average effective income tax rates on such earnings. McNulty, supra
note 44, at 21 n.62; see also, e.g., Davenport, Education and Human Capital, supra note 44, at
826-82 (discussing the difficulties posed by trying to achieve "proper" taxation of human capital
through various surrogates for up-front taxation of human capital accumulations).
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1993). Theoretically, costs associated with education having
a useful life extending substantially beyond the taxable year should be capitalized. However, the
regulations permit educational expenses to be currently deductible as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses under certain narrow circumstances: (1) when the education "[m]aintains or im-
proves skills required by the individual in employment," or (2) when the education meets certain
requirements "imposed as a condition to the retention by the individual of an established employ-
ment relationship, status, or rate of compensation." Id. § 1.162-5(a). Educational expenses neces-
sary to meet the minimum educational requirements for employment (such as high school or
college tuition), or to qualify for a new trade or business (vocational school tuition) are viewed as
"personal expenditures" or as "an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures," and
thus are "not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses." Id. § 1.162-5(b)(1). But
cf Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiar, 591 F.2d 1273-74 (9th Cir.
1978) (holding fees to state attorney licensing authority and fee for admission to practice before
the U.S. Supreme Court to be capital expenditures amortizable over taxpayer's working life ex-
pectancy), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
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contrast, other investment assets have been described as being taxed twice:
once when the investment is made (because the purchase price is nonde-
ductible), and again when income (in the form of periodic dividends or
interest) or gain from the asset is received at the sale or exchange of the
asset, less a basis offset.5 0
The difference in treatment between investment capital and human
capital can be illustrated with an example comparing the treatment of Joe
and Jane, two high school graduates. Joe immediately goes to work as a
fast-food worker, lives at home with his parents, and invests his after-tax
earnings during the next three years in stocks and zero coupon bonds (with
all interest payable three years hence at maturity). Jane, on the other hand,
goes to a three-year vocational school to become a mechanic.
Joe, the investor, purchases assets, the prices of which reflect the pres-
ent value of their future income stream. Because no deduction from his
wage income is allowed for their purchase, he is taxed up front on the in-
vestment expenditure. In addition, he is taxed currently on any dividends
received on his stock51 and on the imputed daily interest income earned by
the bonds over the three-year period, under concepts consistent with the
economic accrual of interest as applied through the original issue discount
rules. 2 If interest rates go down, and the value of the bond goes up, Joe is
not taxed on the appreciation in value of the bond until a sale or exchange.
If he then sells the bond, however, he will recognize gain equal to the
amount realized from the sale minus his adjusted basis in the bond. 3 Simi-
larly, he will not be taxed on the appreciation in value of his shares of stock.
When there is a realization event such as a sale or exchange, he will recog-
nize gain equal to the amount realized from the sale over his adjusted basis
in the shares.
In contrast, Jane, the student, is not taxed up front on a substantial
portion of her investment in vocational school, even though she is allowed
no deduction for her schooling costs. That is so because she is partly ac-
quiring her increased human capital through foregone earnings. Instead of
earning money as a fast-food worker over the next three years and investing
50. As explained in Dodge, supra note 44, at 162 n.100 (citation omitted):
Investments are normally made with after-tax dollars because capital expenditures creat-
ing or purchasing investments are not deductible.... This nondeductible cost of the
investment is, in financial terms, the present discounted value of all future receipts, the
net income portion of which will be taxed again when accrued or received. Human
capital is not systematically taxed twice in the same manner- Accretions to human capi-
tal may or may not be taxed, but wage income is taxed on a gross basis, not on a "net"
basis after amortizing human capital, which is nonexistent.
51. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (West Supp. 1993).
52. Id. §§ 1272-1273. See generally, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, The Time Value of Money
Rules, 42 TAx L. Rv. 1 (1986) (describing the original issue discount rules).
53. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1272(d)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
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in stocks and bonds like Joe, she invests in a vocational education.
Although her tuition fees are paid with after-tax dollars, she is not taxed on
what she could have earned for three years as a fast-food worker or on any
income from investing such earnings. Those foregone earnings constitute a
major portion of the "cost" of her educational investment, and the failure to
tax those foregone earnings is equivalent to allowing her an immediate de-
duction for that portion of the cost of her education.54 Thus, her initial
human capital investment is at least partially tax free.
Like Joe, she is not taxed on any unrealized appreciation in the value
of her capital investment. The increase in her human capital represented by
her training is taxed when she actually receives her increased income
stream, that is, when she begins to receive wages as a newly employed
mechanic three years later. Unlike Joe, she gets no basis offset against
wages for that portion of her investment that was made from after-tax dol-
lars, her tuition costs, for example.
In reality, the tax consequences of acquiring investment and human
capital are much more complex due to the Code's treatment of borrowing,
accelerated depreciation for certain types of assets, qualified retirement ac-
counts, the effects of inflation, and offsets and adjustments under the Code
for various ways of financing education.55 In greatly simplified form, how-
ever, the double tax on investment capital contrasts with the single tax on
investments in human capital.56
B. The Exclusion for Personal Injury Damages: The Policy Debate
Prompted in part by a more expansive judicial interpretation of the
personal injury exclusion over the past decade,57 commentators have been
reexamining § 104(a)(2) on tax policy grounds. Some have concluded that
54. See, e.g., THEoORn W. ScnurLz, fNwEsmENr N HuMAN CAPITAL: THE ROLE OF EDU-
CATION AND RESEARCH 167-68 (1971) (stating that earnings foregone by students constitute more
than half of the real costs of human capital formation by higher education); Michael J. Boskin,
Notes on the Tax Treatment of Human Capital in OFFICE OF TAx ANALYsts, DEPARTMEN OF THE
TREASURy, CoNERIENCE ON TAx RE EARcH 185, 187, 189 (1975) (observing that (1) studies
support the conclusion that "well over half of human capital investment costs consist of foregone
earnings," (2) "[tlhe failure to tax foregone earnings is equivalent to an immediate write-off of
the investment cost," and (3) "[t]he lack of an educational expenditure depreciation allowance
probably biases investments away from education to job training"); cf. BECKER, supra note 3, at
18-29 (noting that unless on-the-job training produces firm-specific training, the employee effec-
tively bears the cost of generalized job training in the form of lower current wages).
55. Stephan, supra note 3, at 1368-75; see also Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxa-
tion, 45 TAX L. REv. 283, 310-12, 319-28 (1990) (discussing the adverse effects of income taxa-
tion on capital formation and describing various investment incentives "grafted on" the income tax
system).
56. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THm Looic OF TAX 112, 221 (1989); Klein, supra note 46, at
476-78, 481.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 159-212.
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the exclusion cannot be justified as a matter of tax policys8 because per-
sonal injury recoveries are "income," and therefore, their exclusion from
gross income constitutes a tax preference.59 Some explain its continued
presence in the Code as a holdover from now outmoded views of the consti-
tutional limits of an income tax,60 or as a humanitarian (or politically expe-
dient) gesture by Congress not to tax those who have received
compensation for personal injuries.6 ' Many have called for legislative ac-
tion,62 including the repeal of the section in its entirety, 3 to respond to
judicial developments.
A few dissenters, at least with regard to the broader question of the
policy justification for § 104(a)(2), rely on the compensatory nature of per-
sonal injury recoveries and view the exclusion as proper because such re-
coveries are not "income." Under this view, the exclusion for personal
injury recoveries (at least to the extent such recoveries are compensatory)
makes sense if the amounts can be seen as a tax-free recovery of human
58. E.g., J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Per-
sonal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MoNT. L. REv. 13, 46 (1989).
59. Allaire U. Karzon, Tax Expenditures and Tax Reform, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1397, 1407-08
(1985) (reviewing STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANni, TAc ExPEmrDrURS (1985))
("[Until the Code Section 104(a)(2) exclusion appears in the formal tax expenditure budget, it
may continue to elude the attention of the legislators and the public and permit some persons to
realize enormous amounts of wealth tax-free."). Section 104(a)(2)'s exclusion is not currently
listed as a tax expenditure, although exclusions for workers' compensation benefits and certain
disability benefits for coal miners are so listed under income security functions. See JoNrr COM-
MrrEE ON TAXATION, EsTMATEs OF FEDERAL TAx ExPDrrRTmES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1994-1998
(JCS-6-93) (Apr. 22, 1993), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 77, at L-1 (Apr. 23, 1993).
The tax expenditure model divides the income tax into two elements: (1) provisions needed
to implement the "normal tax structure," and (2) "special preferences." STANLEY S. SURREY &
PAUL R. McDANaL, TAx ExpmirrURs 3 (1985). The structural provisions include the rate
structure, personal exemptions, accounting period, and the taxable unit and those provisions nec-
essary to define the tax base. Id. Departures from the normal tax are tax expenditures or special
preferences, "designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons" and are viewed
as equivalent to direct government outlays. Id. Beneficiaries of a tax preference are viewed as
having received a government grant or appropriation equal to the amount of the tax reduction due
to the preference. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. Rnv. 705, 706 (1970).
For a discussion of the impact of the tax expenditure model on tax policy formation, see Thomas
D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HAsTNGS L.J. 343, 349-52
(1989).
60. 1 BrrTKER & LoKcEN, supra note 43, 5.6, 13.1.1, 13.1.4; Burke & Friel, supra note
58, at 20-21.
61. See Burke & Friel, supra note 58, at 43.
62. E.g., Joseph W. Blackburn, Taxation of Personal Injury Damages: Recommendations for
Reform, 56 TmN. L. REv. 661, 689-91 (1989); Burke & Friel, supra note 58, at 46-47; Patricia T.
Morgan, Old Torts, New Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain Scope of Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA.
L. REv. 875, 930 (1988).
63. E.g., Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 43, 64-65 (1987); see also Lawrence A. Frolik, Personal Injury Compensation as
a Tax Preference, 37 MAINE L. REv. 1, 35-39 (1985) (advocating repeal of § 104(a)(2)).
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capital." This view assumes, however, that each taxpayer has a substantial
basis in her human capital (represented by expenditures for food, medical
care, education, and so forth).65 In addition, it presumes that the amounts of
court-ordered personal injury awards or settlements do not exceed the vic-
tims' bases in their human capital.6 6 More fundamentally, however, this
view has been faulted as being at odds with the tax system's general refusal
to treat human capital as a conventional asset with basis, as illustrated by
the lack of a deduction for uncompensated personal injury losses and the
lack of depreciation deductions to offset wages.67
Personal injury recoveries for lost earning capacity or lost past wages
raise difficult questions because the wages they supposedly replace other-
wise would be subject to tax. Hence, some have argued that the exclusion
for personal injury damages should not reach such recoveries even if an
exclusion for medical expenses or for pain and suffering damages could be
justified.68 That approach, if adopted, would necessitate a change from cur-
rent law, which excludes lost past or future wages received as part of a
64. E.g., Stephan, supra note 3, at 1400. The exclusion for amounts received for pain and
suffering has been justified as consistent with the nontaxation of imputed income from human
capital. See Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM.
Mrrcnau. L. Rv. 759 passim (1988). But see Dodge, supra note 44, at 182-87 (disagreeing with
Brooks's argument that damages for pain and suffering should not be taxed because they are a
substitute for goods of a nontaxable nature, such as pleasure, pain, or normalcy).
In addition, the exclusion for amounts received to compensate for personal injury medical
expenses has been justified as comporting with the deduction for medical expenses. See Stephan,
supra note 3, at 1402-03 (observing that the medical expense deduction puts the self-compensator
on the same footing as the person who excludes personal injury compensation).
65. See Stephan, supra note 3, at 1392-93 (presuming that taxpayers have a substantial basis
in their human capital and applying a basis-recovery-first rule to partial liquidations of human
capital to support the exclusion of most, if not all, individual injury compensation awards); see
supra note 44 for a discussion of basis.
66. See, e.g., Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considera-
tions, 62 CoRNm. L. Rav. 701, 712 (1977) (criticizing such a presumption and advocating repeal
of exclusion from gross income for lost earning recoveries in personal injury cases).
67. Dodge, supra note 44, at 152-53.
68. E.g., Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain-No Gain? Should Personal Injury Damages Keep
Their Tax Exempt Status?, 9 U. Amu. Ln-rn RocK LJ. 407 (1986-87) (arguing that Congress
should amend § 104(a)(2) to limit the exclusion to personal injury damages for actual expenses,
pain and suffering, and mental anguish, and that damages for lost earnings and punitive damages
should be includable in income); Yorio, supra note 66, at 733-36; see also Thomas D. Griffith,
Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Per-
sonal Injury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. Ray. 1115 passim (challenging traditional tax norms and
suggesting an alternative normative analysis under which it would be desirable to tax recoveries
for lost earnings and pain and suffering and to exempt recoveries for medical expenses); Malcolm
L. Morris, Taxing Economic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury Actions: Towards a Capital Idea,
38 U. FLA. L. Rsv. 735 (1986) (suggesting that economic loss recoveries awarded in personal
injury actions be incorporated into the tax base but in a preferential manner). See generally Susan
K Matlow, Comment, Exclusion of Personal Injury Damages: Have the Courts Gone Too Far?,
44 VArN. L. Rav. 369, 392-94 (1991).
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recovery for a physical injury.69 Personal injury recoveries presumably
would be bifurcated, instead, into taxable and nontaxable portions.
Another quite different type of analysis focuses on whether the receipt
of damages should be treated as an income realization or recognition event
regardless of the theoretical status of such damages as "income." If per-
sonal injury recoveries for lost earnings replace increases in human capital
(increased earning capacity), these recoveries are theoretically "income."70
However, the exclusion from gross income provided by § 104(a)(2) can be
rationalized because the current Code does not treat an increase in human
capital as realized income. Section 104(a)(2) ensures that when human cap-
ital is involuntarily converted into investment capital through a personal
injury damage award, it is taxed only once, just as if it were income from
human capital.71
This analysis, developed by Professor Joseph Dodge, asserts that the
"exclusion-inclusion dichotomy" incorrectly frames the issue.72 He argues
that any resolution of the issue "should be sensitive to both federal tax pol-
icy and state tort policies" by ensuring that plaintiffs are put "in the same
post-tax economic position after receiving the recovery as they would have
been in if the injury had not occurred,"73 regardless of how damages are
computed under state tort law. He proposes a federal tax rule that would
permit states to adapt their compensation rules to their own notions about
the efficient regulation of defendants' conduct.74 Accordingly, Dodge sug-
69. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
70. If they merely replace human capital, as opposed to replacing increases in human capital,
there remains the theoretical issue regarding the status of such recoveries as "income." See supra
notes 64-67 and accompanying text. An analysis that focuses on whether personal injury recov-
eries should be treated as an income realization or recognition event, regardless of whether they
are "income," does not depend for its theoretical validity upon resolving the question of whether
the personal injury results in the loss of existing human capital or the loss of future increases in
human capital, or both.
71. DoDGE, supra note 56, at 112. This view of § 104(a)(2) recognizes it as a mechanism for
ensuring that personal injury damages are taxed in a manner consistent with what would have
occurred under the current Code if there had been no injury to the person's human capital. There
is no need, therefore, to pursue the illusory goal of determining a cost basis in the individual's
body (for physical injuries) or in their social, genetic, or educational endowment to determine how
much of the personal injury recovery ought to be viewed as basis recovery and how much should
be viewed as gain or "profit." That would be irrelevant under the Code's treatment of human
capital, which as described above, ignores basis in this context. See supra text accompanying note
44. The § 104(a)(2) exclusion treats the victim of a personal injury as a wage earner rather than
an investor and generally ensures the result of taxing the human capital income once rather than
twice.
72. Dodge, supra note 44, at 145.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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gests a set of rules that would treat lost earnings variably, according to the
method used to compute damages under state law.75
Under his analysis, at least four basic combinations of state tort dam-
age computation regimes and federal tax treatments are compatible with the
§ 104 exclusion and leave the injured "taxpayer in the same economic posi-
tion as if the personal injury had never occurred,' 76 and two additional
combinations that are consistent with the repeal of § 104 but satisfy the
compensatory goal.77 He summarizes the results as follows:
(1) For periodic-payment recoveries ... , the payments should be
fully excluded if the recovery is computed after taxes;78 otherwise
it should be fully included ....
(2) For lump-sum recoveries invested in annuities 8 ...
75. Id. at 155-67. For lost past earnings, Dodge concludes that the proper federal tax treat-
ment is "easily discerned," and depends on "whether the recovery for lost wages is computed,
under state law, on a before- or after-tax basis." Id. at 165. For example, if the recovery is
computed on an after-tax basis ($100,000 in wages reduced to an after-tax amount of $70,000,
assuming a 30% tax rate), the recovery (of $70,000) should not be taxable. If the recovery is
computed on a before-tax basis ($100,000 in wages, with no reduction for implicit taxes of
$30,000), the recovery (of $100,000) should be taxable for federal income tax purposes. Thus, the
government would receive taxes (of $30,000, assuming a 30% tax rate). In either case, the claim-
ant would receive the same amount ($70,000).
Recoveries for lost future earnings require a more complex analysis. Applying concepts of
financial analysis, Dodge asks "what tax treatment for lost earning capacity recovery would best
replicate what" the injured party would have received from future earnings if there had been no
personal injury. Id. at 155. The injured party would have received wages over some specified
period, which could be as long as her life expectancy or as short as the duration of a less serious
injury. The appropriate amount of any lump sum recovery is the present discounted value of such
wages. Id.




where FV is the amount of money to be paid at some date in the future, i is the daily, monthly,
semiannual, or annual discount rate, expressed as a decimal, and n is the number of (days, months,
half-years or years) periods between the present and the date that the amount is received in the
future. Id. at 155 n.72. The present value of an income stream is the sum of the present values of
all future receipts of income. Id.
76. Id. at 155-56.
77. Id. at 158.
78. See Dodge's first scenario, in which the recovery is in the form of periodic payments. Id.
at 156. Each payment equals the amount the wage earner would have earned after taxes. Id.
Accordingly, the payments should be fully excluded from tax. Id. at 159.
79. See Dodge's sixth scenario, in which payments of before-tax amounts are received peri-
odically. Id. at 158. The payments should be taxed in full. Id. at 159. After taxes, the net amount
received by the injured party would be the same bottom-line result as in his first scenario. Id. at
158.
80. Any lump-sum recovery for lost future earnings "would be required to be reinvested in a
wage-mimicking annuity." Id. at 188; see also infra note 88.
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(a) the lump-sum recovery should be excluded if the recov-
ery is figured on an after-tax basis;81 otherwise it should be
fully included;82 and
(b) the annuity payments should be fully excluded if the re-
covery is calculated using a before-tax discount rate;83 other-
wise they should be treated as payments upon a debt
obligation.84
He concludes that the § 104 exclusion is justified when the recovery is cal-
culated on an after-tax basis because the "taxpayer already bears an implicit
tax on the wage-stream substitute.
' 85
81. As Dodge points out, if the lump sum recovery is computed on an after-tax basis, the FV
"in the present value formula is reduced" by the amount of future taxes. Dodge, supra note 44, at
155 n.73. For example, if a payment of $100,000 is to be received at the end of year one and the
tax rate is 30%, the after-tax Fi is $70,000 ($100,000 - (.30 x $100,000)). Id.
82. In a variation of Dodge's second scenario, the lump-sum recovery, which is computed on
a before-tax basis, is fully taxed. Id. at 158.
83. "The before-tax discount rate is the rate of return (before taxes) on readily available
nonrisky assets." Id. at 155 n.74.
For example, assuming a discount rate of 10% compounded annually, the present value of an
after-tax amount of $70,000, which is to be received at the end of year one, is
PV = $70,000
(1 + .10)1
or $63,636.36. The present value of a three-year after-tax income stream of $70,000 each year,
assuming a before-tax discount rate of 10%, would be $63,636.36 + 57,851.24 + $52,592.04 =
$174,079.60. In other words, $174,079.60 "is the present value, at 10%, of an annuity consisting
of three annual payments of $70,000." Id. at 157 n.78.
Under Dodge's third scenario, in which the lump-sum recovery is computed on an after-tax
basis, using a before-tax discount rate, the annuity payments should be exempted from taxable
income. Id at 156.
84. Id. at 159. In Dodge's fourth scenario, "the lump-sum recovery is computed on an af-
ter-tax basis.... using an after-tax discount rate, and the annuity payments are taxed subject to a
basis offset." Id. at 156. Rather than taxing the annuity payments under I.R.C. § 72, however,
Dodge would tax the annuity payments similarly to receipt of payments under a level payment
mortgage. Id. at 156 n.77. For example, when a loan is repaid, each payment is treated as if
comprised of an amount of interest, computed by multiplying the applicable interest rate times the
remaining principal balance. The remainder of the payment is treated as a return of principal.
Thus, the income portion of each payment declines over time as the principal is paid down. Id.
The after-tax discount rate is the before-tax discount rate reduced by the marginal tax rate. If
the before-tax discount rate is 10%, and the tax rate is 30%, the after-tax discount rate would be
7%. In the example above, the present value of a three-year after-tax wage stream of $70,000 at
the end of each year, assuming a tax rate of 30% and an after-tax discount rate of 7% compounded
annually, would be $65,420.56 + $61,140.71 + 57,140.85 = $183,702.12.
Under the fourth scenario, an annuity could be purchased for $183,702, assuming a 10%
before-tax rate of return and equal annuity payments at the end of each year of $73,869, leaving an
after-tax amount of $68,358 in year one, $70,023 in year two, and $71,855 in year three. Id. at
157.
85. Id at 159. As explained by Professor Dodge, an "implicit tax is not actually transferred
to the government... [but is an] amount that reduces the taxpayer's net return." Id. at 159 n.87.
Whether that rationalized result under § 104(a)(2) is consistent with tort policies concerning deter-
rence, of course, is another matter. Id. at 161-62.
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Professor Dodge's analysis provides one of the most persuasive theo-
retical rationales for § 104(a)(2), as long as personal injury damages are
computed "correctly" for tax purposes under state law. Dodge chooses
neither to force states to conform to a federal model of tort damage compu-
tation, nor to be content with a tax rule resulting in either overcompensa-
tion 6 or undercompensation"7 of plaintiffs. Instead, he proposes that the
federal tax rule adjust to the states' own policy determinations concerning
tort damages." Alternatively, he argues that if § 104(a)(2) is retained in its
current form, states can adapt without undermining the deterrence and pun-
ishment functions of tort law because both of these functions can be
achieved by punitive damages and damages from noneconomic harms, such
as for pain and suffering.89 He concludes that regardless of how economic
recoveries, such as lost earnings, are taxed, both punitive damages and
damages for noneconomic harms should be included in income.90
Dodge's insight that § 104(a)(2) "is neither categorically right nor
wrong" as applied to recoveries for lost earnings seems correct.91 Whether
§ 104(a)(2) results in the right answer depends on how the personal injury
damages are computed. His suggestion of a variable approach to federal
taxation depending on how states have decided to compute tort recoveries is
grounded in tax logic and sensitivity to notions of federalism. Nevertheless,
his legislative proposal for variable federal tax results is unlikely to be
adopted by Congress; neither is the repeal of § 104(a)(2) likely to occur in
the near future. In the meantime, § 104(a)(2) remains in the Code and pro-
86. Overcompensation of plaintiffs would result if the personal injury damages received by
the plaintiff were computed on a before-tax basis (no reduction for the tax liability for lost future
wages, for example) and if the damages were nontaxable under § 104(a)(2).
87. Undercompensation would result if the lost future wages were computed on an after-tax
basis and if the amounts received by the plaintiff were taxable due to the repeal or inapplicability
of § 104(a)(2).
88. Professor Dodge offers the following statutory language with respect to lost earning ca-
pacity and lost earnings to replace § 104(a):
(a) In General-.. . [Giross income shall not include, under regulations prescribed by
the Secretary, such amounts received as damages (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or periodic payments) .... on account of personal injuries or
sickness as are necessary to restore the injured or sick person, with respect to lost earn-
ing capacity and lost earnings, to the same economic position as would have occurred
had the personal injury not occurred, but in the case of any lump-sum recovery only to
the extent that it be invested in an annuity that provides level (or increasing) payments
for a period which is to end no earlier than the earlier to occur of (i) 20 years, (ii) the
attainment by the injured party of age 70, or (iii) the death of the injured party.
Dodge, supra note 44, at 166. The regulations referenced in the statute would incorporate the
results outlined supra in the text accompanying notes 78-84.
89. Id. at 188.
90. Id. at 180-88.
91. See id. at 188.
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duces correct results only when lost earnings are computed on an after-tax
basis.
Professor Dodge's analysis provides a useful framework for under-
standing the proper taxation of lost earnings under federal employment dis-
crimination statutes. 2 If employment discrimination results in a loss of
human capital, and thus constitutes a "personal" injury, excluding employ-
ment discrimination recoveries from gross income may be appropriate, de-
pending on how that loss is compensated under the statutory relief
provisions. Section 104(a)(2) may be applied with more uniformity in the
employment discrimination context than would be possible under Dodge's
approach for state tort recoveries. Congress has imposed its will in the area
of civil rights by providing federal causes of action and federal remedies for
their violation, and thus, federalism considerations do not constrain the ap-
plication of a uniform tax rule and method of computing damages in federal
civil rights cases. 93 Given the possibility of more uniformity in this con-
text, the alternative approach suggested in Part IV of this Article may be
implemented without the repeal or amendment of § 104(a)(2). Although
the alternative approach comports with Dodge's conclusions regarding lost
earnings and punitive damages, it parts company with him on the taxation
of damages for pain and suffering.94
92. Professor Dodge does not discuss issues raised by employment discrimination cases in
any detail, but does comment that "[e]mployment discrimination and civil rights deprivation
cases are apparently more complex, because it is often difficult to determine whether the plaintiff
has really lost human capital." Id at 179 (discussing what is a "personal injury" under the current
§ 104). His uncertainty is based on the unexplained observation that the plaintiff in such cases
"can recover for lost past and future wages even if she ends up with a higher-paying job" Id.
However, back pay recoveries are significantly more restricted under various federal antidis-
crimination statutes than Professor Dodge's statement might suggest. See infra note 117.
The question of whether employment discrimination results in injury to human capital may
be easier to answer than the question of how the recoveries permitted by federal civil rights stat-
utes redress such loss. Federal civil rights laws were enacted to accomplish systemic change as
well as to afford private compensation for discrimination. This Article attempts to explore some
of the complexities of applying a human capital approach to employment discrimination recov-
eries and benefits from Professor Dodge's application of such an approach to state tort recoveries.
93. Uniform federal application could result from judicial decisions adopting the approach
suggested here. State law employment discrimination recoveries may raise issues similar to those
of state tort recoveries in considering how the federal tax rule should be applied in light of states'
potentially varying conclusions as to the "correct' approach to damage computation. Those issues
are beyond the scope of this Article, however, which focuses on the taxation of recoveries under
federal employment discrimination laws.
94. See infra notes 305-37 and accompanying text. As discussed more completely in Part IV
of the Article, the taxation of employment discrimination recoveries should be consistent with the
taxation of personal injury awards. Employment discrimination pain and suffering awards should
therefore be excluded from gross income, unless § 104(a)(2) is amended or repealed. See infra
notes 330-34 and accompanying text.
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C. Theoretical and Pragmatic Issues Concerning Employment
Discrimination Recoveries
As applied to employment-related civil rights awards and settlements,
the § 104(a)(2) exclusion for damages "on account of personal injuries"
requires a determination of whether recoveries measured by lost past or
future wages and, in some cases, damages for medical expenses, emotional
distress, or punitive damages, qualify for the exclusion. Much of the con-
troversy surrounding the recent cases centers on whether recoveries such as
back pay ought to be excluded from gross income when wages received by
the same person would not be excluded. Exclusion of back pay awards
appears to treat similarly situated persons (wage earners) differently for tax
purposes, and thus is criticized as contrary to tax policy.95
Whether the § 104(a)(2) exclusion ought also to apply to employment
discrimination recoveries requires closer examination of the economic and
noneconomic injuries suffered by victims of employment discrimination.
Does employment discrimination result in loss of human capital, which by
its very nature constitutes a "personal" injury?96 Are back pay or front pay
awards an attempt to compensate for any such injury to human capital? If
so, depending on how the awards are calculated, they may be appropriately
excluded from income under § 104(a)(2).97 Instead, are back pay or front
pay awards merely a remedy of specific relief for wages withheld? If so,
they arguably do not compensate for human capital loss and ought to be
taxed as ordinary wages. Answers to these questions may be suggested by
considering the effect of employment discrimination on human capital ac-
cumulation and the approaches adopted by federal employment discrimina-
tion statutes to remedy any such effects. This Article concludes that
employment discrimination results in loss of human capital for the victims
of discrimination and that statutory remedies provide limited compensation
for such loss.
95. See supra notes 58, 68. However, as discussed supra in notes 70-90 and accompanying
text, the § 104(a)(2) exclusion can be rationalized as a means of allowing those who involuntarily
have been injured in some aspect of their wage-earning capacity to be compensated without being
taxed on the monetary recovery for that loss. The recovery replaces human capital, which would
produce earnings in the form of wages. If the recovery is taxed like human capital rather than
investment capital, any wages generated by the nontaxable increased human capital would be
taxed. Thus, a nontaxable recovery based upon a putative wage stream should be calculated on
the basis of an after-tax wage stream. Otherwise, the recovery, or some portion of it, should be
includable in income.
96. See supra text accompanying note 43.
97. See infra notes 305-29 and accompanying text.
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1. The Effect of Employment Discrimination on Human
Capital Accumulation
Employment opportunities affect the accumulation of human capital.9 8
Economists have explored the effect of inequality of employment opportu-
nity on earnings and investment and have observed that race or sex discrim-
ination results in reduced earnings and reduced human capital investment.99
No consensus exists among economists and legal theorists, however, re-
garding the relationship of such effects, their causes, or their amelioration.
Economic models of race and sex discrimination have been applied and
criticized in the ongoing legal debate concerning the efficacy and efficiency
of federal employment discrimination statutes such as Title VII.Le° The
legal debate has focused on whether the antidiscrimination laws effectively
address discrimination in employment and how best to evaluate their
effectiveness. 101
98. See supra note 3.
99. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 31-46 (2d ed. 1971);
BECKER, supra note 3, at 123-30; LESTER THnuow, INvEmm~w IN HuMAN CAPrrI 38-43 (1970)
(discussing the lowering effect of race discrimination on the price of human capital); Theodore W.
Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 3-4 (1961); see also JOHN STUART
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POTICAL ECONoMY bk. II, ch. XIV, §§ 5-6, at 400-03 (W.J. Ashley ed.,
A.M. Kelly 1965) (1909).
100. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DiSCRMnNATION LAWS 145-266 (1992) (applying models of statistical discrimination and individ-
ual preferences and arguing that competitive markets with free entry offer better and more certain
protection against discrimination than antidiscrimination laws); Mary E. Becker, Needed in the
Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in
Employment, 79 Gao. L.i. 1659, 1663-74 (1991) (criticizing economic models of discrimination
for their assumptions of rationality and exogenous preferences, their failure to recognize the desire
to subordinate, and their expectation that markets will eliminate discriminatory desires); John J.
Donohue mN & James J. Heckman, Re-evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEo. L.J. 1713
passim (1991) (criticizing Gary Becker's model of discrimination as based on individualistic pref-
erences and suggesting a model based on systematic social beliefs and coercive social norms);
Richard H. McAdams, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination: Relative Preferences,
102 YALE L.J. 1, 91-103 (1992) (criticizing Gary Becker's descriptive model of race discrimina-
tion-based on a taste for nonassociation-as inconsistent with his later-developed household
production theory, with its reduced emphasis on "tastes" in interpreting behavior; suggesting in-
stead a status competition model for evaluating the efficiency of antidiscrimination laws); David
A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Nu-
merical Standards, 79 GEo. L.i. 1619 passim (1991) (outlining legal and economic models of
discrimination and suggesting that the principal focus of employment discrimination law should
be to induce employers to hire minorities in numbers roughly proportionate to their representation
in the relevant population).
101. See, e.g., John J. Donohue IN, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1337, 1367-68 (1989); John J. Donohue III, Further
Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 523, 538-40 (1987); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411
passim (1986); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1311, 1325-34 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U.
PA. L. REv. 513, 516-21 (1987).
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Without relying on any particular conclusion as to the theoretical rela-
tionship between employment opportunities, discrimination, earnings, and
human capital investment, we can view federal antidiscrimination statutes
as recognizing a practical relationship between discrimination and reduced
opportunity (or loss in human capital) for members of certain groups. Fed-
eral civil rights laws mandate an egalitarian approach toward workplace
opportunities and benefits; that is, employers cannot lawfully discriminate
in their employment decisions based on certain invidious classifications
such as race, sex, religion, or national origin, and sometimes, age or
disability.
10 2
If any of the antidiscrinination prohibitions are violated, the statutes
permit various types of remedial relief."0 3 For purposes of analyzing the
tax implications of such recoveries, the form and content of employment
discrimination statutes as enacted by Congress must be our starting point.
2. The Changing Nature of Discrimination Claims:
The Political Response
The tax issues raised by employment discrimination recoveries sur-
faced during a period of intensive reexamination of federal civil rights stat-
utes. Political activity focused on proposals leading to the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.1'4 The legislation was proposed in response to a series of Supreme
Court decisions that significantly limited prior judicial interpretations of the
statutes' reach.' 0 5 It was passed by Congress and signed into law shortly
102. See supra notes 2, 19; see also infra notes 104, 174-75, 182, 197.
103. This Article does not attempt to address whether the combination of a public law and
private law remedial scheme as it currently exists (with increasing emphasis on private individual
enforcement), and as it existed prior to the recent statutory amendments to employment-related
civil rights statutes, reflects the proper approach to civil rights enforcement.
104. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, vetoed by President Bush after passing both houses of
Congress, was reintroduced early in 1991. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
During this period Congress also passed, and President Bush signed, the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits discrimination against employees with disabilities. Pub.
L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327-378 (1990) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.) Perhaps
in part due to the phase-in of the effective date of the Act (July 26, 1992, for employers with 25 or
more employees, and July 26, 1994, for employers with 15 or more employees), there have been
no reported cases involving the tax treatment of ADA recoveries. Because the enforcement and
remedial provisions of the ADA employment prohibitions track those of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (Supp. m1 1991), the tax treatment of ADA recoveries may simply track the tax treat-
ment of Title VII recoveries. See H.R. REP. No. 485 (I1), 101st Cong. 2d Sess., 23 (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304; see also infra discussion of the post-Burke ADA issues in
text accompanying notes 265-85.
105. The proposed legislation was aimed at overturning several 1989 Supreme Court decisions
and extending the scope of protections and remedies for employment discrimination. See H.R.
REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong. 1st Sess., at 14-15 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 40H), 102d Cong. Ist Sess.,
2-4 (1991); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 164-71 (1989) (limiting 42
U.S.C. § 1981 to formation and enforcement of contracts, and holding that it cannot be used to
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after the bitter Senate confirmation hearings on the nomination of Justice
Clarence Thomas to the United States Supreme Court."° The legislative
proposals ignited discussion concerning the nation's civil rights policy and
raised issues about the statutes' coverage and remedial structure, particu-
larly that of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
The legislative debate occurred in the context of a gradual change in
the form and content of employment discrimination claims. Employment
discrimination litigation formerly emphasized a public law model of sys-
temic class action suits calling for affirmative injunctive relief and aggre-
gated class monetary awards. During the last decade, the litigation was
measurably transformed into a more private-law norm of individual dis-
putes between employers and employees, which frequently involved claims
of discriminatory discharge."0 7
This change in employment discrimination law troubled many civil
rights advocates, not only because of the difficulty of institutionalizing
sweeping changes through the vehicle of many separate individual enforce-
ment actions but also because of the inadequate remedies available for vic-
tims of such individualized discrimination.' The traditional statutory
remedies for individual claims, reinstatement and back pay, were sharply
challenge conditions of employment such as racial harassment); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
490 U.S. 900, 906-13 (1989) (holding that the statute of limitations on discriminatory seniority
plan begins to run at the time the plan is instituted, not at the time concrete harm occurs); Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (holding that white firefighters could bring suit to challenge an
affirmative action plan although they had failed to intervene during court proceedings authorizing
the plan); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655-60 (1989) (holding that the
burden of proving a violation of Title VII under the disparate impact theory remains with the
plaintiff, and the employer can prevail if there is merely a reasoned basis, not necessarily a busi-
ness necessity, for the challenged practice); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258
(1989) (holding that an employment decision motivated in part by prejudice does not violate Title
VII if the employer can show it would have taken the same action in the absence of any prejudi-
cial motives). In addition, several other decisions involving procedural issues, expert witness fees,
and attorneys fees were overruled or clarified. See H.R. REP. No. 40(H), 102d Cong. 1st Sess., at
3-4 (1991).
106. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was signed into law on November 21, 1991. See Statement
on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,27 WEEK. CoMw. PaEs. Doc. 1701 (November 21, 1991).
See generally, e.g., Symposium, Gender, Race and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments:
The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1279 (1992) (dis-
cussing the effects of the hearings).
107. See, e.g., John J. Donohue HI & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1019-28 (1991); Minna J. Kotkin, Public Reme-
dies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HAST. L. J. 1301,
1338-47 (1990). See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1288-1304 (1976) (discussing how certain federal litigation requires courts
to manage more complex situations).
108. For a discussion of this aspect of civil rights policy, see Constance B. Motley, The
Supreme Court, Civil Rights Litigation, and Deja Vu, 76 CoRNa.L L. RFv. 643, 646-55 (1991);
Symposium, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s, 79 CAL. L. REv. 591 passim (1991).
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criticized as insufficient incentive for victims of discrimination to litigate
their claims or for employers to evaluate their subjective decisionmaking
for signs of bias.10 9 The shift to a more private-law model of employment
discrimination litigation also accentuated the limitations of the statute's
public-law remedial scheme as applied to individual actions. This led civil
rights advocates to push for the enactment of provisions permitting com-
pensatory and punitive damages under Title VII. 11
3. Title VII Back Pay and Front Pay Awards: Compensation for
Economic Losses Rather Than Specific Relief for Wages Withheld
The Supreme Court has long emphasized that monetary recoveries
under Title VII serve a dual function: to eradicate discriminatory practices
throughout the economy and to "make whole" the victims of discrimina-
tion.11' Although back pay" 2 has been categorized as a form of equitable
relief, this classification constitutes something of a departure from tradi-
tional notions of equity." 3 Traditionally, equitable restitution "restores" to
the plaintiff either the property wrongfully withheld or the gains resulting
from the withholding and focuses on the "unjust enrichment" of the defend-
ant." 4 Restitution typically depends on the defendant's good faith and the
degree of hardship imposed by the specific relief ordered." 5
In contrast, back pay focuses on compensating the economic losses to
the plaintiff rather than requiring the defendant to disgorge unjust gains. It
109. E.g., Kotkin, supra note 107, at 1378 (arguing that additional remedies should be devel-
oped to buttress Title VII's private enforcement scheme).
110. As discussed in greater detail infra at notes 138-43, the legislation amended Title VII to
allow employment discrimination victims to recover compensatory and punitive damages from
their employers under certain circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1991). In addi-
tion, it amended the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to provide that the right to make
and enforce contracts would include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship." Id. § 1981(b).
111. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). In this case, the Court ad-
dressed the intent and scope of Title VII monetary relief provisions, observing that "back pay
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id.
112. Back pay is authorized under the remedial provision of Title VII, which permits the court
to enjoin unlawful employment practices and to "order such affirmative action as may be appro-
priate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988).
113. Kotldn, supra note 107, at 1370-77. Although the lower courts have held back pay to be
equitable in nature and thus have held that Title VII plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial, the
Supreme Court has never expressly ruled that jury trials are unavailable under the pre-amended
version of Title VII. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
114. Kotkin, supra note 107, at 1372.
115. See DoBBs, supra note 9, at 222-26.
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is available regardless of the amount of defendant's gain, if any, or the
existence of defendant's good faith.'16 In essence, back pay compensates
for the lost opportunity to earn higher wages, either as an applicant for
employment, a candidate for promotion, or as a discharged employee. It is
available regardless of the existence of an actual employment relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant, such as in discriminatory fail-
ure-to-hire cases. The amount of back pay awarded is reduced by any
amount the victim earned or could have earned in another job." 7 All of
these characteristics of a back pay award suggest that it is more compensa-
tory in nature than specific relief for wages withheld from a wronged em-
ployee." 8 Back pay is thus conceptually closer to compensatory legal relief
than to equitable restitution, and its categorization as an equitable remedy
has been criticized as "quasi-fictional.""' 9
Front pay also is available under Title VII, in circumstances in which
instatement or reinstatement of the plaintiff would not be feasible and the
plaintiff has not found comparable work.' 2 It requires an estimate of fu-
116. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422-23 (1975).
117. The back pay award is reduced by "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reason-
able diligence by the person or persons discriminated against." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (Supp.
11 1991). The back pay period thus terminates when the plaintiff obtains a comparable or better
paying position. Id. It may also be terminated if the plaintiff fails to look for alternative employ-
ment or fails to make reasonable attempts to mitigate her loss. See, e.g., BmmARA LwmsANm
ScH~m & PAuL GRossmAN, EMPLOYMENT DisCRMNMAON LAW 1432-34 (2d ed. 1983) &
FIVE-YEAR CUMULATrVE SuppLmAENT 531 (David A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr. eds., 2d
ed. 1989). In addition, back pay does "not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the
filing of a charge" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(1).
118. For a post-Burke discussion of back pay as compensatory rather than as specific relief for
wages withheld, see Hubbard v. Administrator, Envtl. Protection Agency, 982 F.2d 531, 539
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity under 5 U.S.C. § 702
for "relief other than money damages" does not encompass back pay ordered along with instate-
ment in suit against EPA for failure to hire in violation of First Amendment rights). As discussed
in the concurring opinion in Hubbard, the "suffered loss ... is not wages, but the chance to earn
them," and "[black pay makes up for that lost opportunity." Id. at 539 (Randolph, J., concurring).
See also DOBBS, supra note 9, at 69 n.18, 135-38, 528-34, 924-27 (viewing back pay as a type of
compensatory relief akin to damages); cf. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2068
(1993) (referring to Burke as interpreting the terms "any other equitable relief' in Title VII's
remedial provision as precluding awards for compensatory or punitive damages). But see Arthur
W. Andrews, The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 TAx LAW.
755, 770-71 (1993) (suggesting that when the discrimination results in underpayment of wages,
back pay is based upon quasi-contract or implied-in-law contract under which the employee in
effect is seeking restitution, but acknowledging that the restitution theory does not work well
when no wages have been earned by the victim of discrimination).
119. Kotkin, supra note 107, at 1373.
120. Front pay rather than instatement or reinstatement may be ordered where the court finds
it unlikely that the parties will be able to reestablish an effective employment relationship or if an
innocent incumbent would have to be displaced. See, e.g., ScLE1 & GRossMAN, supra note 117,
at 1398 & FrvE-YEAR CumULATnE SuPPLnmmNT, supra note 117, at 516-17 (collecting cases).
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ture lost earnings. Although front pay is not specifically authorized by Title
VII, courts have granted it under the "make whole" approach to monetary
recoveries of Title VII. 12 1 Front pay represents a less restrictive approach
to monetary relief under Title VII than does back pay.122 It attempts to
compensate for the denial of employment opportunities when prospective
relief is unavailable or would be significantly delayed.
Both front pay and back pay are essentially a limited way of compen-
sating for the loss in human capital resulting from employment discrimina-
tion.'1 The limits of pre-amendment Title VII monetary awards and a
more detailed description of the 1991 amendments are illustrated by the
following example. Readers familiar with Title VII claims and remedies
may wish to skip to Part II.
4. Example: Title VI's Remedial Scheme and Its Impact on Human
Capital Loss Resulting from Discrimination
Consider Jane, who wishes to become an airplane mechanic. She
graduates from vocational school and enters the job market. She applies for
a job with an airline but is not hired because of her failure to satisfy some
facially neutral employment requirement or test, such as a height or
weight-lifting requirement imposed by the airline.124 Disappointed, but in
121. SCM.M & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 1434-36.
122. Kotkin, supra note 107, at 1377.
123. Back pay received under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) should be analyzed
in the same way. See supra note 104. Back pay received under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA) and the Equal Pay Act may also be viewed as compensation for the loss of
human capital resulting from employment discrimination. The analysis is somewhat different,
however. There is no need to reach the question of whether back pay constitutes equitable restitu-
tion for specific wages earned but withheld from the employee by the employer because ADEA
and Equal Pay Act awards have been treated as legal damages. See generally Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and holding that trial by jury is avail-
able in private actions under ADEA). Nevertheless, it is especially difficult to distinguish be-
tween wages withheld and the lost opportunity to earn higher wages in the Equal Pay Act context
because the violation being remedied is wage discrimination. That is also why the facts in Burke,
involving Title VII sex-based wage discrimination, see infra text accompanying note 225,
presented the most difficult factual setting. Unlike a contract or implied-in-contract type claim,
however, the employee has no right to the higher nondiscriminatory wage apart from the rights
established by statute. Thus, the employer is not restoring wages "due" the employee. Instead,
the employee is being compensated for economic losses suffered as a result of the discrimination,
the measure of loss being the difference between the higher wages paid male employees and those
paid female employees performing substantially equal work. See infra notes 197, 208.
124. If the airline instead had an explicit policy against hiring women, Jane would prevail
against her employer in a per se disparate treatment case unless the airline could establish that sex
is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988). The BFOQ defense has been con-
strued narrowly and cannot be based upon "stereotyped characterizations." Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321,333 (1977); see also, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387
(5th Cir.) (holding that employer's requirement that flight attendants be female was not a valid
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need of income, she takes a job as a fast-food clerk while continuing to
search for a job as a mechanic. Another disappointed applicant brings a
Title VII disparate impact class action suit against the airline for unlawful
sex discrimination; Jane is a member of the certified class. The class wins
by showing that the airline's hiring policies have a disparate impact on wo-
men; the airline is unable to demonstrate the job-relatedness or business
necessity of its policies."z The court orders the airline to revise its hiring
policies and to implement an affirmative action plan that sets goals and
timetables for hiring. The court also awards back pay to the class. Jane
receives a portion of the back pay award (perhaps after receiving notice and
an opportunity to prove her claim before a special master) measured by the
difference between what she would have made as an entry-level mechanic
and the amount she actually made as a fast-food clerk for the period be-
tween the time she applied for the job and the time she was eventually hired
BFOQ when the essence of the airline's business-providing safe transportation-would not be
undermined by hiring male flight attendants), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. South-
ern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that there must be a
factual basis for believing that all, or substantially all, persons in the excluded class could not
perform the essential job duties and thus concluding that the BFOQ defense did not apply when
the company had precluded women from holding jobs that required lifting more than 30 pounds).
Alternatively, if the airline had neither an explicitly stated policy against hiring women nor a
neutral policy with a disparate impact, but instead had an unstated bias against hiring women as
mechanics, Jane could bring an individual disparate treatment claim. Jane would have the burden
of proving intentional discrimination by the airline. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,715 (1983). If she had no direct evidence of such intent to discriminate,
she could present a prima facie case based upon circumstantial evidence. Id. However, the em-
ployer could defend by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, and thus
prevail, unless Jane could establish that the articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination.
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). But cf. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (holding that "the Title VII plaintiff at all times 'bears the ultimate burden
of persuasion"')
125. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 legislatively overruled Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989), and reestablished much of pre-1989 law concerning disparate impact dis-
crimination. Section 105(a) of the Act adds new § 703(k)(1)(A) to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1991), which states:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this
subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employ-
ment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity....
The terms "job related" and "business necessity" are to be interpreted by reference to pre-Wards
Cove Supreme Court decisions such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See
interpretive memorandum, 137 CONG. Rnc. S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991), which was ex-
pressly incorporated as legislative history on this issue. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 1 1991) (note
on Legislative History).
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as an airplane mechanic. 26 If Jane and others like her cannot be hired
because there are no openings or because laid-off workers stand in line in
front of them, the court may order front pay for the class.127 Jane and other
class members would not be eligible for compensatory or punitive damages
under the 1991 amendments because such remedies are not available for
disparate impact claims.1 8
If Jane is denied the opportunity to develop her skills as a mechanic
through on-the-job training and experience, she will experience a loss in the
human capital she otherwise would have accumulated. The remedies avail-
able under Title VII stem the loss but do not provide complete relief. Af-
firmative injunctive relief is provided; the airline is ordered to change its
policies, and perhaps Jane and others like her will be hired. The order may
also require the airline to give reapplicants retroactive seniority and benefit
credits.'29 The back pay award received by Jane and other claimants may
make up for the wage differential they suffered in the meantime. Neverthe-
less, Jane can never reclaim her lost time in her craft, which may perma-
nently affect her job prospects, as compared to her male counterpart who
graduated from vocational school at the same time and who has been on the
job since then.'30 The implementation of an affirmative action plan and the
deterrent effect of an aggregated back pay award may, however, affect the
prospective human capital accumulation of past and future female appli-
cants in an across-the-board fashion.
In contrast to class-based cases, individual disparate treatment cases
provide a much more limited means of eliminating employment discrimina-
tion. These cases focus on individual private relief. For example, if Jane
later is discriminatorily discharged from her job, she could assert an indi-
vidual claim of disparate treatment under Title VII. To prevail on her
claim, she would be required to prove that, when it terminated her employ-
ment, the airline intentionally discriminated against her based upon her
sex. "' Unless she were in the unusual position of having direct evidence of
126. See supra note 117.
127. See supra note 120. Awards of front pay raise difficult computational issues, particularly
in the context of an aggregate class award. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. in 1991).
129. In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982), the Court held that "absent
special circumstances," the rejection of an employer's unqualified job offer, supplemented by the
right to continue to pursue full court-ordered compensation, terminates the back pay period even
though the offer does not include either retroactive seniority or accrued back pay.
130. Jane's male counterpart, let's call him John, who began his working life as a mechanic
rather than as a fast-food worker, may always remain a step ahead of Jane as a mechanic.
Although it has been suggested that Title VII could support a monetary award for the loss of
employment opportunity as a supplement to a back pay award, the courts have not recognized
such a remedy. Kotkin, supra note 107, at 1377.
131. See supra note 124 for a discussion of individual disparate treatment cases.
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discriminatory motive, she might have difficulty proving her case.132 In
addition, if she succeeded, any effect on the airline would be limited to her
individual case or to the more limited deterrent effect provided by the po-
tential for separate individual enforcement actions. 133 If she were success-
ful in proving her case, she could be reinstated with back pay. She might
also be able to recover compensatory and punitive damages, provided that
the 1991 amendments apply to her case.1
34
Suppose instead that the following scenario occurs. As one of a hand-
ful of newly hired women coming on the job under the court-ordered af-
firmative action plan, Jane is constantly harassed on the job. Jane files a
Title VII individual disparate treatment action against her employer. She
asserts sexual harassment 135 by her supervisor and fellow employees so reg-
132. In mixed-motive cases, the Supreme Court held in 1989 that a plaintiff showing the
presence of a prohibited factor such as gender could carry her burden of persuasion. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989). However, the employer could avoid liability
by showing that the same decision would have been reached even if the illegitimate considerations
had not been present. Id. at 242. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 modifies that approach. Section
703(m) provides that a Title VII violation is established "when the complaining party demon-
strates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employ-
ment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(Supp. mI 1991). However, the employer may demonstrate that it "would have taken the same
action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). If the
employer makes such a showing, the court may grant declaratory relief, some injunctive relief,
and attorneys' fees and costs directly attributable to the § 703(m) claim. Id. The court may "not
award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
payment [of back pay]." Id.
133. It is possible to assert classwide disparate treatment. See, e.g., International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 334 (1977). In such a case, plaintiffs challenge an em-
ployer's pattern and practice of discriminatory treatment. A pattern and practice case may more
likely involve a challenge to hiring rather than firing practices because of the statistical showing
required in classwide disparate treatment cases. For example, in a hiring case, plaintiffs introduce
statistical evidence of significant disparities between men and women in the employer's work
force compared to the general labor force and other relevant labor pool data and couple this
statistical showing with evidence of individual instances of discrimination. See id. at 334-40 n.20,
357-62. However, "[w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper
case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination." Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). The focus at the prima facie case stage is not on
individual employment decisions but on a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking. To rebut a
prima facie showing of classwide disparate treatment, the employer must demonstrate that the
statistics used by the plaintiffs are either inaccurate or insignificant and provide a nondiscrimina-
tory explanation for the apparently discriminatory result. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 360 n.46.
134. See infra note 139.
135. Sexual harassment constitutes a violation of Title VII if the employer bases employment
benefits on a quid pro quo exchange of sexual favors, or if the harassment is "sufficiently severe
or pervasive to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."' Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (quoting Henson
v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)). Liability may be established without economic
losses resulting from the discrimination, and agency principles are considered in determining
whether an employer is liable for the actions of the employee's supervisor. Id. at 72.
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ular and severe that she suffers emotional distress and physical stress symp-
toms. 136 In addition, she claims that the hostile working environment has
resulted in discriminatory job assignments; that is, she has been assigned to
routine maintenance tasks rather than more challenging repair jobs given to
male mechanics at her level of skill and experience. She decides to file a
disparate treatment claim against her employer. Prior to filing suit, she
leaves the airline for another job as a mechanic with a new employer at the
same pay level.
Before the 1991 amendments to Title VII, even if she won her case
(unless she prevailed under state statutory or tort law), she could recover no
punitive damages, no compensatory damages to cover her medical ex-
penses, and no damages for pain and suffering. She could claim the moral
victory of a judgment against the airline for unlawful discrimination and
possibly some back pay if there were a gap between her old and new job. If
there were no gap in time or in pay, she would receive no monetary recov-
ery.13 7 Thus, she would have no compensation for the loss in human capital
resulting from a stagnation in job skills or for the psychic or physical symp-
toms caused by the harassment.
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, she would be able to receive some
monetary recovery, 138 provided that she could prove intentional discrimina-
tion.13 9 Punitive damages are available (other than against a governmental
136. Jane must show that the harassment was "severe or pervasive enough to create an objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., - U.S. -, 1993 WL 453611 (November 9,
1993). In addition, as long as she establishes that she subjectively perceived the environment to
be abusive, she need not show that it was "psychologically injurious." Id.
137. If she were the prevailing party, she would be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. M 1991). But see Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882
F.2d 1235, 1236-37 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversing district court's order of attorneys' fees and nominal
damages of one dollar in pre-amendment Title VII case in which the district court found that there
had been sexual harassment but that the harassment had not caused plaintiff's discharge), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
138. In addition, unlike claims brought under the pre-amended version of Title VII, which
were tried before a judge, not ajury, she would have the right to a jury trial if she sought compen-
satory or punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (Supp. MI 1991).
139. Compensatory and punitive damages are limited to disparate treatment claims. They are
expressly unavailable as remedies for claims of disparate impact. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). In
addition, the claimant must not be eligible for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. For the text
of § 1981, see infra note 175. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled the Supreme Court's
decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 164-71 (1989), see supra note 105,
by providing that § 1981 applies to the "making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson, § 1981
had also been applied to prohibit racial discrimination (including racial harassment) on the job.
See, e.g., Nazaire v. Trans World Airlines, 807 F.2d 1372, 1380 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1039 (1987) (citing racial harassment cases); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593,
597-99 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding a retaliation claim actionable under § 1981). The proviso in
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defendant) if the defendant acted "with malice or with reckless indiffer-
ence" to an individual's federally protected rights."4 Compensatory dam-
ages awarded under the Act do not include back pay or interest on back pay
or any other equitable relief authorized under the pre-amended version of
Title VII.14 1 They include "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffer-
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses."' 42 The recoverable compensatory and punitive dam-
ages are limited, however, to a combined total of specified amounts ranging
from $50,000 to $300,000, depending upon the number of the defendant's
employees. 143
I. SECTION 104(a)(2) HISTORY AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: ADOPTION
OF THE "NATURE OF THE CLAIM" TEST AND ITS APPLICATION BY
REFERENCE TO THE 'TORT OR TORT-LIKE" STANDARD
Many of the issues the Supreme Court faced in Burke echo those con-
sidered by the courts and the government when the predecessor of
§ 104(a)(2) was adopted, shortly after Congress first enacted the personal
income tax."'4 The legislative history provides little insight into the reasons
for adoption of the exclusion and suggests that it was merely a clarification
of existing law.' 45 Although the then-existing law was based upon what is
amended Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a), that compensatory and punitive damages are available
in cases of intentional discrimination only if the complaining party cannot recover under § 1981,
prevents overlap of remedies for race discrimination (compensatory and punitive damages are
available under § 1981).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
141. Id. § 198la(b)(2). Back pay would be recoverable under another provision of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
142. Id. § 198la(b)(3).
143. The lowest cap of $50,000 applies to employers of 15-100 employees. For employers
with 101-200 employees, the cap is $100,000. For employers with 201-500 employees, the cap is
$200,000. For employers with more than 500 employees, the cap is $300,000. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. I 1991). The statute provides that the court is not to inform the jury of
such limitations. Id. § 1981a(c)(2).
144. The first modem income tax was adopted in 1913. Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166
(1913). The predecessor of § 104(a)(2) was § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40
Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919), which provided that gross income does not include "[almounts received
... as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness."
For a more complete description of the origins of § 104(a)(2) and the history of its adminis-
trative interpretations, see Paul C. Feinberg, Federal Income Taxation of Punitive Damages
Awarded in Personal Injury Actions, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 339, 356-69 (1992) and Burke &
Friel, supra note 58, at 14-23.
145. H.R. REP. No. 767,65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part (2) 86,92
("Under the present law it is doubtful whether... damages received on account of... injuries or
sickness ... are required to be included in gross income."); see also H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4039 (discussing the treatment of
injury payments under insured and noninsured employer benefit plans); S. RPi. No. 1622, 83d
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now viewed as a flawed notion of "income," it nevertheless manifested a
more sophisticated understanding of human capital than has generally been
credited. That history is briefly set forth below, along with a description of
the initial administrative interpretation of the exclusion as applied to recov-
eries for nonphysical injuries, and then, more specifically, to employment
discrimination recoveries.
After describing the major legal developments of the last decade, in-
cluding the judicial adoption of the "nature of the claim" test and its impact
on cases applying the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to employment discrimination
recoveries, Part 1[ analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Burke. The
Part closes with a preview of post-Burke problems concerning application
of the tort-like standard and the recommendation that the standard be
discarded.
A. Early Administrative Interpretations of the Exclusion for Personal
Injury Damages
Before enactment of the exclusion for personal injury damages, the
law was subject to changing administrative interpretation. Just prior to en-
actment, the Treasury department concluded that an amount received for
personal injuries sustained "through accident" was not taxable and revoked
a prior regulation to the contrary.146 Treasury based its change in position
on a 1918 Attorney General's opinion which concluded that the proceeds of
an accident insurance policy did not constitute "income" as defined by the
Supreme Court.147
The Attorney General's opinion has been described as based on the
notion of the human body as a kind of capital, with recoveries for injuries
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4817 (discussing the committee's
amendment to proposed § 104(a)(4) and the otherwise identical House and Senate versions of
§ 104).
146. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918), reprinted in 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 127,
130 (1918) (revoking Treas. Reg. No. 33, Revised, Part L Ruling 25 (1918)).
147. See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). At the time, the Supreme Court defined "in-
come" as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined." Id. at 306 (quoting
Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)); accord Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (defining income as "'gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conver-
sion of capital assets" (citations omitted)). The Eisner formulation was reconsidered and aban-
doned by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31
(1955), which held that punitive damages received in an antitrust action are includable in gross
income. The Court in Glenshaw Glass adopted a more expansive view of income, as "undeniable
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." Id.
at 431.
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viewed as a tax-free recovery of such capital. 14  The opinion explains the
basis for its conclusion more precisely as follows:
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the
"capital" invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense
the proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they go,
capital which is the source of future periodical income. They
merely take the place of capital in human ability which was de-
stroyed by the accident. They are therefore "capital" as distin-
guished from "income" receipts.
1 49
The Attorney General's analysis of accident insurance recoveries suggests
that the insurance proceeds substitute for the "capital in human ability,"
which is the source of future income in the form of wages. This analysis
constitutes an essential part of the policy justification for the personal injury
exclusion discussed above, as applied to recoveries for lost future earn-
ings.'5 0 It falls short of that justification, however, by failing to distinguish
between the taxation of human capital and investment capital. In addition,
at its inception, the administrative justification for the exclusion rested on
the notion that personal injury recoveries were simply not "income," but
instead constituted a recovery of capital. 15'
The income exclusion was for a short period administratively inter-
preted as applying only to damages received on account of physical inju-
148. See Burke & Friel, supra note 58, at 14 (quoting 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918)) ("An
Attorney General's opinion held that accident insurance proceeds were not taxable, based on the
theory that the human body is a kind of capital and the insurance proceeds represented a conver-
sion of the capital lost through the injury"); Stephan, supra note 3, at 1388 (citing T.D. 2747, 20
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918)) ("Characterization of the human body as a 'kind of capital,'
albeit based more on analogies to physical goods than on any abstract notion of future income
flows, thus led to exclusion of proceeds from the conversion of any part of this asset.").
149. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. at 308.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 71-93.
151. Later developments in the Supreme Court's view of "income," most notably in Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955), see supra note 147, did not lead to a reevaluation
of the tax administrators' view that personal injury damages did not constitute "income." The
failure to revisit the issue may be explained in part by the Court's footnote in Glenshaw Glass
distinguishing the taxation of punitive damages from the longstanding treatment of compensatory
personal injury recoveries as a tax-free recovery of capital. 348 U.S. at 432 n.8. Instead of receiv-
ing a fresh look in light of the Glenshaw Glass Court's broader view of "income," the early
authority merged with the administrative and judicial statutory interpretation of the § 104(a)(2)
exclusion. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33 (superseding Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92
(1922) by restating its conclusion under current statute and regulations); BrrrKER, & LoKccNr,
supra note 43, [ 5.6, 13.1.4. See generally Burke & Friel, supra note 58, at 21 ("It is curious that
a line of authority based on a discredited theory of gross income which does not rely on or purport
to interpret (and in most cases does not even acknowledge) an existing statutory exclusion should
later be viewed as defining the scope of the statutory exclusion.").
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ries. 152 Tax administrators and the courts soon rejected that view, however,
and held that damages for nonphysical injuries, such as alienation of affec-
tions or defamation of personal character, did not constitute income. 153 The
Service later developed a different reason for denying application of the
exclusion to certain "nonphysical" injuries, such as damage to reputation.
That analysis turned on whether recoveries for such injuries were "per-
sonal" as opposed to "business" injuries. If a business receives compensa-
tion for loss of business profits, the recovery is taxable because the damages
are received by the injured party "in lieu of' or as a substitute for the lost
profits. This approach, long applied to damages received in the "commer-
cial" setting,154 was used by the Service in this more personal setting. For
physical injuries, the Service applied essentially a per se approach, which
assumed their nature as "personal" injuries. No such assumption was made
for "nonphysical" injuries.
For example, for nonphysical torts such as libel or defamation, the
Service distinguished between damages for injury to personal reputation
and those for professional or business reputation. Under this approach,
damages for an injury to the taxpayer's business or professional reputation
are not treated as excludable damages on account of personal injuries.155
Instead, such damages measured by lost income are treated as income sub-
stitutes, which are includable in gross income.
Applying the above analysis, the Service treated employment discrimi-
nation recoveries as gross income because they constituted replacement of
lost business income rather than damages on account of personal injury.1 56
The Tax Court ratified the Service's approach,157 and until the mid-1980's,
152. S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920) (holding damages received on account of alienation of affec-
tions not within the exclusion); S. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919) (holding that damages received for libel
are taxable).
153. E.g., Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq., VII-1 C.B. 14 (1928) (relat-
ing to damages received for libel and slander); Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (holding that
damages received for alienation of affection are not income).
154. Similarly, if a business receives damages for loss of "good will," the recovery represents
a return of capital, which may be nontaxable if the business can present evidence to establish the
basis in its lost good will. E.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (Ist
Cir.) CThe test is not whether the action was one in tort or contract but rather the question to be
asked is 'In lieu of what were the damages awarded?"'), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
155. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55 (refusing to follow the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Roe-
mer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 398 (1982), and instead adopt-
ing the Tax Court's position that defamation damages to business reputation are includable in
gross income).
156. E.g., Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32 (holding recovery under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 includable in gross income).
157. Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975) (Title VII settlement).
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employment discrimination back pay recoveries were generally viewed as
includable in gross income.'58
B. Cases Setting the Stage: The "Nature of the Claim" Test
Several key federal appellate decisions, decided in the early 1980s,
tested the nature of the claim for relief to determine the tax status of an
award or settlement amount. Those decisions held that the § 104(a)(2) ex-
clusion applies to damages awarded for "nonphysical" personal injuries
such as libel and defamation, 159 malicious prosecution, 160 and constitutional
torts.' 61 They rejected the Service's position that the exclusion encom-
passes damages in the nature of lost wages only when the claim involves
"physical" (for example, loss of life or limb) or other "nonbusiness" dam-
ages (for example, damage to personal rather than to business reputation).
Instead the courts increasingly looked to the nature of the claim for relief to
determine the tax status of the award, rather than focusing on the specific
type of damages recovered (amounts compensating for lost wages, medical
expenses, or pain and suffering).
In determining whether the underlying claim for relief constituted a
"personal injury" instead of injury to business interests, the courts, at times,
turned to state tort law for guidance. For example, in Roemer v. Commis-
sioner, the Ninth Circuit found that damages for an insurance agent's loss
of income from a false credit report constituted excludable damages on ac-
count of a personal injury. 62 The court relied in part on the fact that the
plaintiff had filed a libel suit-a personal injury action under California
law-rather than an action for disparagement or trade libel, which would
remedy an attack on the quality of the plaintiff's products or services.'
63
Having determined that the underlying claim involved injury to the person,
the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the nature of the claim should not be
confused with the derivative consequences, such as loss of reputation in the
158. See infra text accompanying notes 159-72 for a discussion of the changes occurring in
the 1980s.
159. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 398
(1982).
160. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988), aff'g 87 T.C. 1294 (1986)
(adopting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Roemer).
161. Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 873 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding nontaxable an
award of back-pay damages in civil rights action for wrongful discharge in violation of First
Amendment); Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987) (addressing claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of First Amendment rights).
162. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700.
163. Id. at 699; see also Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 82 (noting that the Tax Court had concluded
that an action for malicious prosecution is a personal injury action under Tennessee law); infra
note 172.
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community and any resulting income loss. 164 The court explained that the
consequences of a personal injury, such as loss of future professional in-
come, are often the most persuasive means of proving the extent of the
injury. The court thus refused to distinguish between damage to personal
reputation and damage to professional reputation for purposes of
§ 104(a)(2).
65
In another case rejecting the distinction between business and personal
damages, Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 66 the Sixth Circuit excluded from
gross income the settlement proceeds of a malicious prosecution suit in
which a portion of the settlement had been allocated to injury to the tax-
payer's professional reputation. The court affirmed the Tax Court's deci-
sion to abide by the Ninth Circuit's approach in Roemer.'67 The Tax Court
applied a broad definition of a "personal injury," stating that "[e]xclusion
under section 104 will be appropriate if compensatory damages are received
on account of any invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by
virtue of being a person in the sight of the law."
' 168
C. Employment Discrimination Cases
Utilizing this "nature of the claim" analysis, taxpayers receiving
awards or settlements for various types of employment discrimination be-
gan to assert eligibility for exclusion under § 104(a)(2). They argued that a
claim for discrimination in the workplace based on race, age, sex, religion
or national origin was by its very nature an injury to the person. The Ser-
vice rejected such claims, relying on its position that such recoveries consti-
tuted gross income as replacement of lost business income, not damages on
account of personal injuries. 169 Although the Tax Court initially approved
164. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 699 ("The personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its
effect.").
165. In Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55, the Service announced that it would not follow the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Roemer in cases where the court's decision was not controlling.
166. 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988).
167. Id.
168. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988).
169. See supra text accompanying note 156.
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the Service's position, 170 taxpayers began to succeed with their § 104(a)(2)
arguments in the courts of appeals.
17 1
The analysis applied by the Tax Court and the various courts of ap-
peals differed somewhat, depending on the particular statutory basis for the
underlying discrimination claim. For the most part, employment discrimi-
nation claims were asserted under federal antidiscrimination statutes, elimi-
nating the question of whether state or federal law controlled when deciding
if such claims were for "personal injuries" within the meaning of
§ 104(a)(2). 17
2
1. Claims Under Sections 1981 and 1983
Settlements or awards for violation of the post-Civil War civil rights
acts have been held excludable under § 104(a)(2). 173 The Civil Rights Act
of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prohibits violation of constitutional
or statutory rights under color of state law.'74 The Civil Rights Act of
1866, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibits racial discrimination in the
making or enforcing of contracts. 175 Unlike § 1983, which requires a show-
170. See supra note 157; see also Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510, 522 (1989) (age
discrimination recovery), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990). Other
courts came to apparently conflicting conclusions with regard to this issue. Compare Sweet v.
General Tire & Rubber Co., 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 32,644 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (concluding
that a Title VII settlement award was not includable in gross income) with Sears v. The Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,388 (D. Kan. 1982) (finding Title VII
settlement amounts subject to federal income tax, and therefore approving plaintiffs' tax compo-
nent as part of the back pay formula to offset the adverse tax impact of receipt of the back pay
awards in a single year).
171. See infra text accompanying notes 173-212.
172. See generally William A. Stahr, Comment, What Effect Should State Law Have in Defin-
ing "Personal Injury" Damages for Purposes of LR.C. Section 104(a)(2) Exclusion?, 29 SAN
Dmoo L. REv. 299, 332-33 (1992) (criticizing reliance on state tort law to define what is meant by
"personal" injury for federal tax purposes).
173. E.g., Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 873 (10th Cir. 1989) (awarding damages
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987) (addressing
settlement under § 1983); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 858 (1987) (§§ 1981, 1983,
1985(3), 1986, and Title VII), aff'd without published opinion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13) (also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act). The text of § 1983 provides as
follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. M 1991) (originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27). The original Act was passed under the authority of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, however, the
statute was reenacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1870 to remove any doubt of its constitutional
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ing of state action, § 1981 affords a federal remedy against purely private
acts of discrimination. 176 Successful claimants under §§ 1981 and 1983 are
entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, in
certain circumstances, punitive damages. 177 Relief may include amounts
measured by lost wages, and such an award is not limited by the time period
specified for back pay recovery under Title VII. 78
The tax issues focus on whether the § 1981 or § 1983 recoveries are
received on account of "personal injuries" within the meaning of
§ 104(a)(2).' 79 In the leading case, Bent v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
relied on Supreme Court precedent, holding that § 1983 claims are analo-
gous to personal injury suits for statute of limitations purposes.' 80 Bent
involved a teacher whose contract was not renewed following his public
criticism of school programs. The teacher filed a § 1983 action for viola-
tion of his right of free speech. The Third Circuit, affirming the Tax
Court's ruling in favor of the teacher, held that he was entitled to exclude
from gross income settlement amounts received in lieu of damages for
mental pain and suffering, emotional distress, and lost wages. 181
2. Age Discrimination Claims
The Tax Court initially held that recoveries under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA") of 1967182 are partially excludable from
authority. See Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144. The current version
of § 1981(a) provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right... to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
As discussed earlier, see supra note 139, § 1981 has been amended to clarify its application to
race discrimination on the job as well as in hiring, and that such rights are protected against
impairment by both private and state action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)-(c) (Supp. III 1991).
176. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); see supra note
175.
177. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460 (§ 1981). See generally Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-59
(1978) (discussing § 1983 damages).
178. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460. An award of back pay under § 1981 instead is subject to the
relevant state statute of limitations. See 2 CnALEs A. SuLLivAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DIscmMi-
NATION § 23.1.1 (2d ed. 1988). For a description of the limitations on back pay awards under
Title VII, see supra note 117 (stating that back pay does not accrue from a date more than two
years prior to the filing of an EEOC charge).
179. See infra note 265 for discussion of post-Burke application of the tort-like standard.
180. 87 T.C. 236, 247 (1986) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)), affd, 835 F.2d
67 (3d Cir. 1987). A similar analysis would be applicable to § 1981 claims. See Metzger v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 852-56 (1987).
181. Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987).
182. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)).
The ADEA is closely modeled on Title VII with regard to its substantive provisions and enforce-
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income.'" 3 Later it held that such awards are fully excludable, however,
after appellate courts rejected the distinction between ADEA liquidated and
nonliquidated damages for purposes of § 104(a)(2). 184
In Rickel v. Commissioner,'85 for example, the Service argued that the
ADEA action was in the nature of an action for breach of an employment
contract, rather than a tort action. In the Tax Court's view, ADEA actions
had elements of each.'8 6 It concluded that, although ADEA liquidated
damages are intended as compensation for a tort or tort-like injury, ADEA
back pay awards are in the nature of a breach of contract recovery and thus
are includable in income.'8 7 The Third Circuit rejected the Tax Court's
approach, relying on an earlier decision in Byrne v. Commissioner18  in-
volving the settlement of claims of retaliatory discharge under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act as well as wrongful discharge under state law.189 In
Byrne, the court held that all such claims involve the assertion of a personal
injury, a tort or tort-type right, rather than an economic right arising out of a
contract. 190 The Byrne court rejected the Service's argument that compen-
satory damages for nonphysical injuries are taxable unless the taxpayer can
ment structure. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer...
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual... because of such individual's age .... "
(emphasis added)) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual... because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... (emphasis added)). The
ADEA, however, incorporates the remedies available under § 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 216 (1988), providing liquidated damages that require the doubling of back pay
awards in the case of "willful violations." Id. § 626(b). An exception to mandatory liquidated
damages applies if the employer establishes that its actions were made in good faith and it had
reasonable grounds for believing that it was not violating the act. Id. § 260.
183. See Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510,522 (1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 900
F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
184. As described in note 182, the ADEA incorporates certain remedial provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). The FLSA permits aggrieved employ-
ees to recover "unpaid minimum wages" or "unpaid overtime compensation," as well as an equal
amount of mandatory "liquidated damages" for employer violations of minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour laws. Id. § 216(b). Although the FLSA makes liquidated damages mandatory, id., the
ADEA provides such double damages only in cases of willful violations of the ADEA. Id.
§ 626(b). In addition, the ADEA permits the courts "to grant such legal or equitable relief as may
be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the ADEA], including without limitation judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section." Id.
185. Rickel, 92 T.C. 510.
186. Id. at 521.
187. Id.
188. 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989).
189. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 660-61.
190. Byrne, 883 F.2d at 215. In Rickel, the Third Circuit extended its analysis in Byrne to
ADEA claims, observing that "we do not believe that the ADEA, and federal employment dis-
crimination statutes in general, are usefully viewed as a Congressional attempt to rewrite the terms
of employment contracts." Rickel, 900 F.2d at 662.
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show that the injuries are personal in nature and not related to business. 91
In the court's view, the nonpersonal consequences of discrimination-the
loss of wages--did not transform discrimination into a nonpersonal in-
jury.' 92 Thus, the entire amount of the settlement was held excludable
under § 104(a)(2). 193 A similar result was reached by the Sixth Circuit in
Pistillo v. Commissioner. 94 The Tax Court later overruled its prior deci-
sions with regard to the nonliquidated portion of ADEA recoveries and con-
cluded that nonliquidated damages based on back pay received under the
ADEA are also excludable under § 104(a)(2).' 9s
3. Title VII and Equal Pay Act Claims
The tax treatment of recoveries under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964196 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963197 underwent similar reevaluation
by the courts. As stated earlier, the Tax Court initially held that back pay
awards under Title VII' 98 are includable in gross income.' 99 After the ap-
pellate decisions in Roemer" and Threlkeld,2°1 however, the Tax Court
suggested that discrimination claims based on sex or national origin under
Title VII, and later, claims based on age or race, are in the nature of tort or
tort-like claims, and thus recoveries for such claims may be excludable
191. Byrne, 883 F.2d at 214.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 216.
194. 912 F.2d 145, 149 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'g 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 874 (1989).
195. Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 168-170, 173 (1991). Because the Tax Court's
decision in Downey was appealable to the Seventh Circuit, a circuit that had not yet decided the
issue, the Tax Court was not bound by the appellate decisions in Rickel and Pistillo. See Golsen v.
Commissioner, 445 F.2d 985, 988 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). Nevertheless,
the Tax Court disavowed its earlier analysis and decided to follow the lead of the Third and Sixth
Circuits. Downey, 97 T.C. at 168. See infra text accompanying notes 289-90 for discussion of the
Tax Court's post-Burke reaffirmance of Downey.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988); see also supra note 19.
197. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)). The
Equal Pay Act prohibits certain gender-based wage discrimination when it can be shown that the
wage disparity occurs in situations where men and women perform substantially equal work. Id.
§ 206(d)(1). The Equal Pay Act permits such wage disparities, however, if paid pursuant to a
seniority system, a merit system, any system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production, or a differential based on any other factor other than sex. Id. An employer may not
attain compliance with the Act by reducing the wage rate of any employee. Id. The Equal Pay
Act provides for liquidated damages unless a good faith defense is established. Id. §§ 206(b)(3),
216(b).
198. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text for description of back pay and front pay
under Title VII.
199. See supra note 157.
200. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 398 (1982);
see supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
201. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988), aff'g 87 T.C. 1294 (1986);
see supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
1994] TAXATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AWARDS 589
under § 104(a)(2).2°2 The Sixth Circuit explicitly adopted that approach
Burke v. United States.2" 3
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took a different
approach in Sparrow v. Commissioner.2' In Sparrow, the court focused on
the remedial structure of Title VII and concluded that § 104(a)(2) did not
apply to Title VII recoveries because Title VII provided only equitable re-
lief, not legal "damages" as contemplated by § 104(a)(2).205 Thus, the
court's decision turned on its construction of the term "damages" rather
than "personal injuries."2"6
With regard to claims brought under both the Equal Pay Act2 0 7 and
Title VII,20 the Tax Court applied an analysis similar to the one it had
202. See Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 851 (1987), aff'd without published opinion,
845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); cf. Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 1, 18 (1992) (holding settle-
ment amounts allocated to race discrimination excludable); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.
150, 164-65 (1991) (applying the rationale in Metzger to an age discrimination claim under the
ADEA in holding that such claims, like those based on sex or national origin, are in the nature of
tort or tort-like claims).
203. 929 F.2d 1119, 1123 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
204. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992).
205. Id. at 438. In Sparrow, the court relied on the distinction between suits in equity and
actions at law. Id. at 436-37. When the predecessor of § 104(a)(2) was enacted by Congress, the
distinction may have had more vitality than it does currently. Because Congress used the term
"damages" with regard to personal injuries, the court concluded that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion
does not apply to Title VII back pay. The court reasoned that the exclusion was not meant to
encompass recoveries under suits in equity, such as Title VII actions. Id. at 436-38. See supra
notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing back pay as a remedy closer in concept to legal
damages than to equitable restitution).
The Sparrow opinion was issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia after
the petition for certiorari was filed by the government in Burke, but before the briefs on the merits
were due. The taxpayers in Burke argued that the Sparrow court's conclusion not only was based
on an archaic distinction, but also misstated the law at the time the exclusion was enacted. Brief
for Respondents at 12-13, Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (No. 91-42). They argued that although
a party seeking only monetary relief had to bring a suit "at law," in a case properly in equity, the
court could dispense compensatory damages when necessary to give complete relief. Id. at 13.
206. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 437.
207. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Sex-based wage discrimination claims are often brought
under both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act due to different procedural and remedial provisions
available under those two different statutes. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 293
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying overlapping remedies under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act). For
example, Equal Pay Act plaintiffs may file suit without exhaustion of administrative remedies, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), and are entitled to a jury trial. Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md.
1978); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 n.7 (1978) (construing the FLSA). Title VII
plaintiffs are now entitled to a jury trial only in limited circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(c)(1)
(Supp. 1I 1991). Unlike Title VII actions, only representative actions, not ordinary class actions
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are available under the Equal Pay
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Similarly situated employees may be joined as plaintiffs, but they must
"opt in" or they will not participate in or be bound by the judgment. Id. This makes class-type
wage discrimination claims much more cumbersome under the Equal Pay Act. Notice of settle-
ment is correspondingly less burdensome, however.
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initially applied to ADEA claims. It bifurcated the nonliquidated (or back
pay) portion of Equal Pay Act awards, which it treated as a taxable con-
tract-type recovery,2 °9 from the liquidated damages portion, which it treated
as a personal injury recovery and thus excludable under § 104(a)(2). 210 The
Title VII back pay recovery was also treated as taxable income.211 That
approach was subsequently affirmed by the Fourth Circuit,212 setting the
stage for Supreme Court review of the Sixth's Circuit's decision in Burke,
based on an apparent conflict among the circuit courts of appeals.
D. Congressional Response to Developing Case Law
Meanwhile, in response to the case law developments outlined above,
Congress considered limiting the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) to damages
received on account of "physical injuries. 213 Congress did not enact this
Remedies under the Equal Pay Act are set forth in sections 16 and 17 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Id. §§ 216-17. Unlike Title VII, which provides for no liquidated damages, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1988), the Equal Pay Act provides for liquidated damages, with an exception if a
good faith defense is established. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988). Under the Equal Pay Act, lost
wages are generally limited to two years before the date the lawsuit is filed, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)
(1988) (three years for willful violations), compared to Title VII, in which back pay is computed
with reference to the date the EEOC charge is filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (back pay does
"not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge"). See generally
ScrL & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 439-42 (discussing remedies); Clyde Summers, Effective
Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. Rv.
457, 479-500 (1992) (same).
209. Thompson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632, 646 (1987), aff'd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.
1989).
210. Id. at 650.
211. Id. at 648. Subsequent to its decision in Thompson, the Tax Court held that ADEA lost
wages and liquidated damages, also based on Fair Labor Standards Act remedial provisions, are
excludable under § 104(a)(2). See supra note 195. The Tax Court at that time specifically refused
to opine whether its conclusions in the ADEA context would apply to the Equal Pay Act. Downey
v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 169 (1991).
212. Thompson, 866 F.2d at 712.
213. In 1989, the House proposed that § 104(a)(2) be amended to read as follows:
[G]ross income does not include.., the amount of any damages received . . . on
account of personal injuries or sickness in a case involving physical injury or physical
sickness....
H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 § 11641 (1989) (emphasis added). The House Report
states that courts have interpreted the § 104(a)(2) exclusion "broadly in some cases to cover
awards for personal injury that do not relate to a physical injury or sickness. For example, some
courts have held that the exclusion applies to damages in cases involving employment discrimina-
tion and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury or sickness." H.R. RP. No. 247,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1354-55, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25. It gives as the
reasons for the proposed change the following explanation: "Amounts received as damages for
personal injury or sickness receive favorable tax treatment in that they are excludable from gross
income. The committee believes that such treatment is inappropriate where no physical injury or
sickness is involved." Id. at 1355, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2825. There was no corre-
sponding Senate amendment, and the conference committee did not adopt the House proposal.
See infra note 214.
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proposed limitation. Instead, in 1989, Congress amended § 104(a)(2) to
provide that the exclusion does not apply to punitive damages for nonphysi-
cal injuries.2 14 Although the amendment clarified that punitive damages are
taxable in cases involving nonphysical injuries, it left the tax status of other
punitive damages in doubt.215
Prior to adoption of the amendment, the Service took the position that
the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) did not encompass punitive damages of any
kind.216 That position was generally supported by the case law and the
view that, although the exclusion could perhaps be justified to the extent
that personal injury recoveries are compensatory in nature, punitive dam-
ages could not be similarly justified.217 Nevertheless, the amendment sug-
gests by negative implication that, contrary to the assumption under prior
law, the exclusion may apply to punitive damages for physical injuries.2 1
As described in greater detail below, Burke promised resolution of
many of the legal issues raised by various employment discrimination
cases. Despite the government's invitation to issue a broad decision pre-
cluding application of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion for age, sex, and race-based
214. With no explanation of its action, the conference committee declined to adopt the House
proposal as described supra note 213 and instead adopted an entirely different amendment limit-
ing the exclusion for certain punitive damages. The 1989 Act inserted at the end of § 104(a)(2)
the sentence "[plaragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case
not involving physical injury or physical sickness." Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988)). The
amendment applies to amounts received after July 10, 1989, in tax years ending after that date.
However, it does not apply to any amount received (1) under a written binding agreement, court
decree, or mediation award in effect on (or issued on or before) July 10, 1989, or (2) pursuant to
any suit filed on or before July 10, 1989. Id. § 7641(b), 103 Stat. at 2379.
215. See Paul C. Feinberg, Federal Income Taxation of Punitive Damages Awarded in Per-
sonal Injury Actions, 42 CASE W. Rns. L. Rnv. 339, 346-49 (1992); David G. Jaeger, Taxation of
Punitive Damage Awards: The Continuing Controversy, 57 TAx NoTEs 109 passim (1992); Craig
Day, Comment, Taxation of Punitive Damages: Interpreting Section 104(a)(2) After the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1989, 66 WASH. L. Ray. 1019 passim (1991).
216. See Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, revoking Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. But see
Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983) (relying on Rev. Rul. 75-45).
217. In 1989, the Tax Court held punitive damages to be excludable in a defamation case.
Commissioner v. Miller, 93 T.C. 330, 332 (1989). However, the Fourth Circuit later reversed the
Tax Court's decision, holding that punitive damages are not excludable under the pre-1989 ver-
sion of § 104(a)(2). Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590-91 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C.
330 (1989); accord Reese v. United States, 28 Cl. Ct. 702, 710 (1993) (holding pre-1989 punitive
damages to be includable in gross income); Rice v. United States, 93-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 50,488
(E.D. Cal. 1993) (same); Kemp v. Commissioner, 771 F.Supp. 357, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding
that punitive damages received from settlement of a § 1983 action are not excludable under
§ 104(a)(2)). See infra text accompanying notes 277-85 for post-Burke developments.
218. See Mark W. Cochran, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion Over Tax Status of Personal
Injury Damages, 49 TAx NoTEs 1565, 1567 (1990).
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discrimination recoveries,219 the Supreme Court issued a very narrow deci-
sion that left many issues unresolved.
E. The Supreme Court's Derision in Burke: "Tort-Like" Standard
Applied to Determine Nature of the Claim
In United States v. Burke,22 the Supreme Court held, by a vote of
seven to two, that a back pay award in settlement of a Title VII sex-based
wage discrimination claim is not excludable from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2).221 The majority held that Title VII did not redress a tort-like
personal injury because it did not permit recovery for traditional harms as-
sociated with personal injury such as pain and suffering, emotional distress,
harm to reputation, and other consequential damages. In its then applicable
form, Title VII permitted only the award of back pay, injunctions, and other
equitable relief.222
Three female employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
filed the Burke case as a tax refund suit. They received distributions under
the settlement of a Title VII action brought against the TVA by an individ-
ual plaintiff and the Office and Professional Employees International Union
(the "Union"). The women asserted that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion was ap-
plicable to a Title VII settlement award. The Title VII complaint, filed in
1984, claimed that the TVA intentionally discriminated against female em-
ployees when it (1) increased the salaries for employees in certain
male-dominated pay schedules, while not increasing the salaries of employ-
ees in certain female-dominated pay schedules and (2) lowered the salaries
in certain female-dominated pay schedules. In addition, the complaint al-
leged that the pay schedules had a disparate impact on female employees.223
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and back pay for all the affected
employees. 224
219. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
at 17, United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (No. 91-42):
The question presented in this case has substantial recurring administrative importance
because it affects the thousands of individuals who have received or will receive back
pay under Title VII or under other federal employment discrimination statutes, such as
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act.
220. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
221. Id. at 1874. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy joined. Justices Scalia and Souter filed
concurring opinions, taking issue for different reasons with the majority's analysis. Justice
O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.
222. Id. at 1872-73.
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The TVA filed a counterclaim against the Union. After the district
court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties settled. z2 5
Under the settlement agreement, the TVA agreed to pay $4,200 to the origi-
nal individual plaintiff and a total of $5 million to the other affected em-
ployees. 26 The TVA withheld federal income taxes and social security
taxes from amounts distributed to claimants receiving an allocated portion
of the $5 million settlement award.227 Several of the claimants then filed
for refund of the withheld taxes.
The district court denied the refund claim, ruling that, because the wo-
men had sought and obtained back pay rather than compensatory or other
damages, the amounts were not excludable as "damages received.., on
account of personal injuries."22 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that
the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) depends upon whether the injury and the
claim are "personal and tort-like in nature,"'229 and concluding that Title VII
provides a tort-like cause of action for injury to the dignity of the person.230
The Sixth Circuit observed that "[a]t no point do we inquire into the nature
of the damages involved," but "the narrow scope of our gaze is properly
225. The survival of a motion for summary judgment on the disparate impact claim was a
significant legal breakthrough for the plaintiffs, given the uncertainty regarding the status of such
disparate impact wage discrimination claims when the jobs performed could not meet the equal
work requirements of the Equal Pay Act. See American Fed'n of State, County, and Municipal
Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the disparate
impact analysis is inapplicable to such a wage discrimination claim). See generally County of
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (recognizing such a wage discrimination claim
brought as a Title VII disparate treatment case).
226. The original settlement agreement provided that the Union would distribute the $5 mil-
lion lump sum amount to the individual claimants. Under an amended settlement agreement, the
TVA agreed to distribute the lump sum settlement amount directly to individuals under a formula
developed by the Union based on length of service and rates of pay. See Burke v. United States,
929 F.2d 1119, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991). In addition, the TVA agreed to conduct a new regional
salary survey, and the bargaining agreement between the TVA and the Union was amended to
provide a method of salary arbitration for the future. Id.
227. Although the TVA did not withhold taxes from the amount paid to the original individual
plaintiff, it insisted on withholding from amounts distributed as part of the $5 million settlement.
For example, Therese Burke was entitled to $764.94 of the settlement proceeds. The TVA with-
held $152.99 in federal income tax and $54.69 in FICA tax from Burke's check, leaving her with
$557.26 net of taxes. Burke, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 83,747.
228. ld at 83,749. The district court's opinion relied on the fact that the underlying Title VII
claim involved wage discrimination, which would entitle a prevailing plaintiff to equitable relief
(possibly entailing back pay, front pay, and fringe benefits), but not compensatory or punitive
damages. The court emphasized that the settlement agreement provided for allocation based on
pay rates and length of service, and that when "coupled with the fact that the complaint refers only
to wage discrimination, it is more apparent that the payments dispersed by the TVA to the various
plaintiffs ... were not merely 'measured by' back wages.. . , but were payments 'in lieu of'
wages not paid under schedules derived from allegedly sexually-based regional studies." Id. at
83,748 (citations omitted).
229. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121.
230. Id. at 1123.
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limited to the 'origin and character of the claim ... and not to the conse-
quences that result from the injury.' "231 The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals, relying on Title VII's remedial scheme in
holding that the injury and claim were not tort-like in nature.232
In reaching this result, the majority opinion first noted that neither
§ 104(a)(2) nor the legislative history provided any explanation of the term
"personal injuries." Relying on a Treasury regulation issued in 1960, how-
ever, the Court stated that the regulations "formally have linked identifica-
tion of a personal injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2) to traditional tort
principles. ''2 3 After reviewing common-law tort concepts, the Court ob-
served that "[rlemedial principles... figure prominently in the definition
and conceptualization of torts," and that "one of the hallmarks of tradi-
tional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to com-
pensate the plaintiff." 34 Thus, in the Court's view, the concept of a "tort"
is "inextricably bound up with remedies-specifically damages actions.
2 35
The Court then examined the remedial scheme of Title VII. By exam-
ining the remedial scheme to answer the question of whether the claimants
suffered a tort-like "personal injury" for purposes of federal income tax law,
the Court defined the nature of the claim by reference to the remedies per-
missible under the statute.236 The Court emphasized that, in contrast to tort
remedies for physical injuries or for a "dignitary" or nonphysical tort, such
as defamation, 'Title VII does not allow awards for compensatory or puni-
tive damages; instead, it limits available remedies to back pay, injunctions,
and other equitable relief." 7 In addition, the Court observed, somewhat
cryptically, that the courts of appeals have held that, unlike ordinary tort
plaintiffs, Title VII plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial.23 8
231. Id. (quoting Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81
(6th Cir. 1988)).
232. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1873-74 (1992). The Court expressly confined
its analysis to the federal income tax question. It did not address the question whether back pay
received under Title VII constitutes "wages" subject to taxation for FICA purposes. Id. at 1869
n.1.
233. Id. at 1870 (citing 25 Fed. Reg. 11,490 (1960)). For the text of § 1.104-1(c) of the
regulations, promulgated at 25 Fed. Reg. 11,490 (1960), see supra note 1.
234. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1871 (citation omitted).
235. Id. at 1872 n.7.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1873.
238. Id. at 1872. The reference to the lack of jury trials in Title VII actions (regardless of the
fact that the Court itself had never so ruled) is puzzling because the availability of a jury trial is
most relevant to the issue of whether Title VII recoveries are "damages" on account of personal
injuries. The D.C. Circuit held that this issue was dispositive in Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949
F.2d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding Title VII relief to be equitable in nature and thus not
"damages" within the meaning of § 104(a)(2)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992). The Burke
Court did not explicitly reach the issue.
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Significantly, the Court acknowledged that discrimination could con-
stitute a "personal injury" for purposes of federal tax law if the relevant
cause of action "evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy." '239
The majority then distinguished Title VII from other federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes.240 The Court focused on the back pay remedy, stating that
"Congress declined to recompense Title VII plaintiffs for anything beyond
the wages properly due them-wages that, if paid in the ordinary course,
would have been fully taxable."241 Accordingly, the Court held that Title
VII does not redress a tort-like personal injury within the meaning of
§ 104(a)(2) and applicable regulations.242
In a footnote, the Court left open the possibility that it might reach a
different result under the amended version of Title VII. 43 Under the
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor challenged the majority's reference to the apparent unavaila-
bility of a jury trial for Title VII claims. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1880 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
After pointing out that the Supreme Court has on a number of occasions expressly declined to
address that question, Justice O'Connor observed that the majority had failed to explain the rele-
vance of the availability of ajury trial to the excludability question. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
She also criticized the majority's analysis, suggesting that the Court may have rejected excludabil-
ity because Title VII suits are equitable rather than legal in nature. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The applicable Treasury regulation, however, does not define "damages received" in terms of
remedies available in actions at law, but instead defines it in terms of amounts recovered through
prosecution or settlement of a "legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights." Id. at
1880-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)). Thus, in Justice
O'Connor's view, the regulation "renders the historical incidents of 'actions at law' and 'suits in
equity' irrelevant to the proper interpretation of § 104(a)(2)." Id. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (citation and emphasis omitted).
239. Id. at 1873.
240. The Court distinguished Title VII from 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and fair housing actions under
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which both allow for jury trials and for compensatory
and punitive damages. Id. at 1873-74.
Justice O'Connor's dissent took issue with the majority's attempt to distinguish Title VII
from other antidiscrimination statutes that have been found analogous to tort suits for other pur-
poses. Id. at 1879 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For example, in deciding that claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are most appropriately subject to the statute of limitations applicable to state tort
claims for personal injury Justice O'Connor argued that the Court failed to look to the remedies
afforded under § 1983, but instead looked to the "essence of the claim" and the "elements of the
cause of action." Id. at 1879 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
268 (1985)). Similarly, in deciding the appropriate state analogue to suit under § 1981, the Court
considered the rights protected by the law, racial discrimination being a "fundamental injury to the
individual rights of a person," rather than the remedies permitted under the statute. Id. at 1880
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987)).
Justice O'Connor argued that when such actions have been found to be tort-like, the Court has
relied on the nature of the rights protected, rather than on the remedies provided. Id. (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). See generally William Wroblewski, Note, Application of the Personal Injury Ex-
clusion to Awards for Sex Discrimination under Title VII: U.S. v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992),
71 NEB. L. REv. 1272, 1276-82 (1992) (criticizing the majority opinion in Burke and arguing that
the dissent's analysis on this issue is more persuasive).
241. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 (citation omitted).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1874 n.12.
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amendments provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, claims of intentional
discrimination may be tried before a jury and remedied with compensatory
and punitive damages. 2' The taxpayers in Burke argued that the expanded
scope of Title VII, as amended, provided additional support for their con-
tention that Title VII claims are inherently "tort-like" in nature.24 The
Court rejected that argument, but suggested that it might reach a different
result under the amended version of the statute, noting that "Congress' deci-
sion to permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages under the
amended act signals a marked change in its conception of the injury
redressable by Title VII. '246 The Court concluded, however, that the
amendments could not "be imported back into analysis of the statute as it
existed at the time of [the taxpayers'] lawsuit" against their employer.247
Writing separate concurring opinions, Justices Souter and Scalia
agreed with the majority that the settlement amounts were taxable, but each
employed sharply different reasoning in reaching that result. Justice Scalia
argued that a more "common sense" construction of the terms "personal
injuries or sickness" in § 104(a)(2) would limit application of the exclusion
to injuries to the recipients' physical or mental health; thus, the exclusion
ought not apply to nonphysical injuries such as defamation. 48 Regardless
of whether a Title VII discrimination victim suffers psychological harm as a
result of the discrimination, he concluded that "[t]he only harm that Title
VII dignifies with the status of redressable legal injury is the antecedent
economic deprivation that produced the Title VII violation in the first
place. '2 49 Justice Scalia's analysis resembles the position of the Service,
which maintains that employment discrimination constitutes an economic
or business injury rather than a "personal" injury. He acknowledged, how-
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. In contrast to the majority's view that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 fundamentally
changed Title VII actions, Justice O'Connor viewed the amendments to Title VII as simply a
recognition on the part of Congress that "existing penalties [were] insufficient to effectuate the
law's settled purposes." Id. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Even before the amendments to
Title VII, Justice O'Connor pointed out, the statute reached not only economic inequality, but also
racially hostile working environments and sexual harassment in the workplace. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Relying on Congress's stated reason for the new remedies-that additional remedies
"are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace," id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(1), 105
Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991))-Justice O'Connor concluded that the new remedies more completely
serve the established goals of Title VII, which had always offered a "tort-like" cause of action for
the injury of employment discrimination. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 1874 n.12.
248. Id. at 1876 (Scalia, J., concurring).
249. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). As Justice O'Connor pointed out, this view
of Title VII is difficult to square with its application to claims involving racially hostile working
conditions or sexual harassment. Id. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ever, that his "common sense" reading of the statute was inconsistent with
the "tort or tort-like" standard adopted by Treasury in § 1.104-1(c). 5
Under his statutory analysis, the settlement payments are not "on account of
personal injuries" within the meaning of § 104(a)(2)."5
Justice Souter, in contrast, accepted the view that the exclusion applied
if the Title VII action was based on "tort or tort-type rights." 2 He then
reviewed the arguments in favor of placing Title VII on either side of the
line dividing contract and tort actions, acknowledging good reasons for
either conclusion." 3 He disagreed with the majority's view that the
"tort-like" character of the claim should turn on whether the plaintiff can
recover for "intangible elements of injury." However, he agreed that back
pay is "quintessentially a contractual measure of damages" 4 and acknowl-
edged the resemblance of rights guaranteed under Title VII to those "com-
monly arising under the terms and conditions of an employment
contract." 5 Turning then to the "default rule" of statutory interpretation-
that exclusions from income must be construed narrowly-he concluded
that he need not decide whether the action was more "tort-like" or more
"contract-like." 6 In his view, when application of the exclusion was not
clear, the exclusion of income should be denied." 7
Writing in dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Thomas, dis-
agreed with the majority's premise that the remedies available under Title
VII fix the character of the rights they seek to enforce. Justice O'Connor
instead focused on the purposes and operation of Title VII, which are
"closely analogous to those of tort law." 8 Thus, although the focus of her
analysis was quite different, Justice O'Connor, like the majority, accepted
the "tort or tort-like" standard adopted in the regulations.
In examining the nature of the statute, Justice O'Connor pointed out
that employment discrimination is actionable under Title VII without regard
to the contractual arrangements between the parties; "courts award compen-
sation for [the] right to be free from certain [types of injury] in the work-
place." 9 In addition, "monetary relief... serves a public purpose beyond
offsetting specific losses" by providing an incentive for employers and un-
ions to examine their employment practices for possible violations or ques-
250. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
251. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 1877 (Souter, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 1878 (Souter, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 1877 (Souter, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 1878 (Souter, J., concurring).
256. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
257. ML (Souter, J., concurring).
258. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 1879 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
tionable practices.260 Thus, she maintained that the purpose of Title VII is
not only to compensate the victim for injuries suffered,261 but also to elimi-
nate discrimination throughout the economy. 262 Justice O'Connor con-
cluded, therefore, that Title VII operates functionally in the traditional
manner of torts; it provides compensation for invasions of a right to be free
from certain injuries, and at the same time, it provides a public deterrent
purpose beyond offsetting specific losses.263
F. The Post-Burke Landscape: Applying the "Tort-Like" Standard
Numerous post-Burke issues confront the lower courts. Cases involv-
ing back pay awards under the pre-amended version of Title VII fall within
the narrow holding of Burke.264 However, many issues, including the taxa-
bility of post-amendment Title VII or Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) recoveries, and the treatment of amounts received under ADEA or
the Equal Pay Act, await future resolution.265 Courts must closely examine
the remedies provided under the various employment discrimination stat-
utes to determine whether the claims are sufficiently "tort-like" for statutory
recoveries to constitute personal injury damages.
260. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
261. Turning her attention to the back pay remedy itself, Justice O'Connor challenged the
majority's assertion that not taxing back pay would give victims of discrimination a "windfall"
because the wages they would have received but for the discrimination would have been taxed.
Id. at 1880 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She pointed out that making back pay awards nontaxable
would simply treat Title VII litigants like other personal injury victims. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). Victims of a physical injury are able to exclude the entire amount of any recovery, "'even if
all or a part of the recovery is determined with reference to the income lost because of the in-
jury."' Id. at 1880 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294,
1300 (1986), affld, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)).
262. Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(1975)).
263. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
264. E.g., Harris v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 519 (1992) (applying Burke to
pre-amendment settlement of race discrimination case challenging General Accounting Office
promotion procedures); Fogle v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 242, 243 (1992) (same). In
addition, some cases may require post-Burke resolution of factual issues regarding the extent to
which payment might be allocated to back pay. E.g., Leib v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH)
3166, 3168 (1992).
265. Based on the distinction drawn by the Burke Court between Title VII's remedial scheme
and that of § 1981, which permits recoveries for both compensatory and punitive damages (as
does § 1983), the Service has held that recoveries for § 1981 violations are nontaxable. Rev. Rul.
93-88, 1993-41 I.R.B. 4 (Dec. 20, 1993); see also Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., No.
C-88-1467MHP, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18271, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 1993) (holding that
§ 1981 consent decree payments are excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2)); John-
son-Waters v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 252 (1993) (where the Service apparently con-
ceded that the portion of a settlement award allocated to plaintiff's § 1981 claim was excludable
as tort-like damages under § 104(a)(2)). The same result should apply to § 1983, although the
Service has not yet so ruled.
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1. Recoveries Under Title VII and the ADA
The Title VII and ADA tax-related issues will require interpretation of
the new remedial provisions adopted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.266
The major issue to be resolved is how broadly the "nature of the claim" test
and the "tort or tort-like" standard will be applied to the new remedial
scheme: that is, whether the tests adopted in Burke will be applied to the
entire range of remedies available under Title VII or the ADA or more
narrowly to the specific remedies available for the types of claims asserted
in any given case.
The 1991 amendments, which make "tort-like" compensatory and pu-
nitive damages available under certain circumstances,2 67 arguably have the
effect of making any post-amendment Title VII or ADA violation a "per-
sonal injury" because the change in the scope of remedies available under
Title VII or the ADA may make the remedial scheme sufficiently "tort-like"
as a whole. If so, the § 104(a)(2) exclusion would apply generally to any
post-amendment recovery, including any back pay received pursuant to dis-
parate impact or disparate treatment claims. Thus, any Title VII or ADA
recovery would be excludable regardless of whether compensatory and pu-
nitive damages are in fact available for the type of claim asserted or
whether such damages were sought by the plaintiff. Courts would apply the
"nature of the claim" test by examining the range of remedies available
under the statute as a whole rather than focusing on the particular theory
asserted to establish liability. Such a broad approach offers the most uni-
form tax results-all post-amendment recoveries would be excludable.
On the other hand, taxability may depend more particularly upon the
type of Title VII or ADA claim asserted and the scope of relief available for
that type of claim.26 It may depend, for example, on whether the claimant
asserts intentional discrimination under a disparate treatment theory,2 69 for
266. ADA's employment discrimination remedial provisions track those of Title VII. Com-
pare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(2) and 12117 (ADA) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 198la(a)(1) (Supp. M 1993)
and 2000e-5(g) (Supp. mH 1993) (Title VII); see also supra note 104.
267. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 124-43 and accompanying text for discussion of disparate impact and
disparate treatment claims; see also Andrews, supra note 118, at 768-69 (arguing that taxation
will depend upon the type of Title VII claim asserted). But see Stender, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18271, at *7 (suggesting that the remedies added to Title VII in 1991 make it sufficiently tort-like
to exempt Title VII awards generally).
269. The General Counsel's Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency charged with enforcing Title VII, has limited its guidance to disparate treat-
ment cases in a recently issued litigation guidance memorandum to regional attorneys on the
taxability of damages and the Burke decision. The memorandum states that "it is the position of
OGC that monetary relief awarded in EEOC disparate treatment actions under Title VII as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ... is excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2)" EEOC General Counsel Memorandum on Civil Rights Act of 1991, DAumY LAB. RaP.
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which compensatory and punitive damages are available, or challenges a
facially neutral policy with disparate impact on a protected group,"70 for
which such damages are unavailable. If this narrower view of the "nature of
the claim" test is adopted, Title VII and ADA settlements or recoveries
involving both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims would have
to be apportioned into taxable and nontaxable amounts. Back pay recov-
eries would be taxable if received as part of the recovery for a disparate
impact claim, but would be nontaxable if received under a disparate treat-
ment claim.
2 71
The Service recently applied Burke in such a claim-specific manner in
Revenue Ruling 93-88.272 The Service held that compensatory damages
and back pay received for disparate treatment sex discrimination are exclud-
able under § 104(a)(2). The Service explained that the same result would
apply even if the recovery in the case were limited to back pay. Back pay
received for disparate impact sex discrimination, however, would not be
excludable. In addition, the Service held that compensatory damages and
(BNA), No. 34, Feb. 23, 1993, at E-1. Without discussing disparate impact claims, the memoran-
dum expressly restricts its conclusions to disparate treatment claims:
All of the considerations which led the Court to conclude that Title VII claims were not
"personal injury" claims within the meaning of section 104(a)(2) were removed by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Under the amended Title VII plaintiffs are entitled to jury
trials and may recover compensatory and punitive damages where appropriate. Title VII
disparate treatment claims are now indistinguishable from claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which the Burke Court used as
paradigms of claims covered by section 104(a)(2). Therefore, we will take the position
that Title VII claims as to which the new remedies are available are "personal injury"
claims, and, therefore, money recovered by individuals need not be included in taxable
income.
Id.; see also Tax Litigation, Damages Under Age Bias Act Are Taxable, EEOC Counsel Says in
Revised Memorandum, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), No. 41, Mar. 4, 1993, at G-1 1 (referring to re-
vised memorandum dated March 1, 1993, in which OGC reiterated its conclusion and stated that
monetary relief in disparate treatment actions is "likely" to be nontaxable).
270. See Andrews, supra note 118, at 768-69 (arguing that back pay received pursuant to
post-amendment disparate impact claims are taxable).
271. Conceivably, it could be argued that back pay awards should be taxable even if received
pursuant to a disparate treatment claim. See Andrews, supra note 118, at 769-70. That argument,
however, makes the "nature of the claim" test adopted in Burke meaningless. It is also inconsis-
tent with the treatment of lost past and future wages for physical personal injuries. See Carolyn F.
Kolks, Note, United States v. Burke-Does It Definitely Resolve the Analytical Confusion Cre-
ated by the Section 104(a)(2) Personal Injury Exclusion?, 46 ARK. L. REv. 656, 674-78 (1993)
(suggesting and rejecting various arguments in favor of including back pay awards for intentional
discrimination in gross income after Burke).
272. 1993-41 LR.B. 4 (Dec. 20, 1993). The ruling discusses two factual situations: first, a sex
discrimination case in which an individual received back pay and compensatory damages in satis-
faction of a disparate treatment claim under Title VII; and second, a race discrimination case in
which an individual received back pay and compensatory damages under Title VII and § 1981.
Both situations involved wrongfully denied promotions. Although the cases raised no disability
claims, the Service noted that a similar analysis would be applied to amounts received under the
ADA.
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back pay received in satisfaction of a claim for racial discrimination under
§ 1981273 and Title VII are excludable under § 104(a)(2). Here, too, the
Service specified that the same result would be reached even if the recovery
were limited to back pay. Under the reasoning of the ruling, recoveries in
cases with both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims (as in
Burke) would be partially excludable and partially taxable, raising poten-
tially difficult allocation issues.
The ruling does not address the issue of punitive damages. As sug-
gested by the express limitation contained in § 104(a)(2), taxability may
vary depending on whether the relief granted is compensatory or punitive.
The 1989 amendment to § 104(a)(2) provides that the exclusion does not
apply to "any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving
physical injury or physical sickness."'274 Accordingly, punitive damages re-
ceived in connection with a nonphysical injury are taxable. The tax treat-
ment of punitive damages received pursuant to Title VII and the ADA thus
depends on whether there is some physical manifestation of the injury
caused by the discrimination. That may be quite possible, particularly in
cases where punitive damages are available; that is, those involving actions
taken "with malice or with reckless indifference" to the plaintiff's rights.2 75
For example, discrimination could result in actual physical injury in a sex-
ual harassment case, or more frequently, in emotional distress leading to
medical treatment for physical symptoms. 2 76 This possibility raises the
broader issue of whether punitive damages for physical injuries should be
nontaxable after Burke.
Although that issue was not before the Court in Burke, the Court stated
in dictum that, in 1989, "Congress amended [§ ] 104(a) to allow the exclu-
sion of punitive damages only in cases involving 'physical injury or physi-
cal sickness.' '277 Contrary to the Court's characterization of the 1989
amendment, however, Congress did not make a positive statement about the
excludability of punitive damages for physical injuries. Congress merely
stated that punitive damages for nonphysical injuries were not excluda-
ble.2 7 In the same breath, the Burke Court also pointed out Congress' as-
sumption in 1989 that compensatory damages in both physical and
nonphysical injury cases would be excludable.2 79 The distinction between
compensatory damages, which compensate for loss of human capital, and
273. See supra note 265.
274. I.R.C. § 104(a) (West Supp. 1993).
275. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. HI 1991).
276. See Andrews, supra note 118, at 775-76.
277. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1871 n.6 (quoting I.R.C. § 104(a) (1989)).
278. See supra text accompanying note 274.
279. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1871 n.6.
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punitive damages, which serve other purposes, may justify different tax
treatment for compensatory and punitive damages.28 °
Nevertheless, the Tax Court and several district courts have held in
post-Burke decisions that punitive damages for physical injuries are exclud-
able, relying on the "nature of the claim" analysis in Burke.281 In Horton v.
Commissioner,28 2 the Tax Court held that if the claim involves a "personal
injury," any type of damages received, including punitive damages, are ex-
cludable.283 The dissent in Horton emphasized that punitive damages are
not generally received "on account" of the injury, but are instead designed
to punish or discourage certain behavior of tortfeasors; thus, they should be
included in income.284 The view that tort-like punitive damages must sat-
isfy the additional requirement of being received "on account" of personal
injuries has recently been adopted by the United States Court of Federal
Claims.285 Presumably the Service will continue to litigate this issue, re-
quiring further consideration by appellate courts.
2. ADEA and Equal Pay Act Recoveries
Determining the tax treatment of ADEA and Equal Pay Act recoveries
also requires application of the tort-like standard applied in Burke.286 Many
of the pre-Burke issues remain because Burke offers little guidance concern-
ing how they should be resolved. The major issue to be resolved for both
ADEA and EPA cases is similar to that discussed above for
post-amendment Title VII cases: How broadly or narrowly should the "na-
ture of the claim" test and the "tort-like" standard be applied to the statutes'
remedial scheme? Upon closer examination of the remedial scheme, will it
280. Courts had so held prior to Burke. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
281. Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 100-01 (1993) (holding nontaxable a punitive
damage award for personal injuries caused by gas explosion and fire in home, which resulted from
utility's gross negligence); accord Hawkins v. United States, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 150,208
(D. Ariz. 1993) (citing Burke and holding punitive damage award excludable under § 104(a)(2));
O'Gilvie v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,567 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding excludable
punitive damage award of $2.48 million paid to husband in wrongful death of wife who died of
toxic shock syndrome, and modifying pre-Burke ruling of taxability on motion for reconsideration
in light of Supreme Court's decision in Burke); see also Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 1994
Tax Ct. MEMO LEXIS 1 (Jan. 5, 1994) (applying Horton and holding pre-1989 punitive damages
for malicious prosecution and invasion of privacy excludable from gross income).
282. 100 T.C. 93.
283. Id. at 100-01.
284. Id. at 108-12 (Whalen, L, dissenting) (considering state law and general tort principles
concerning the nature of punitive damages and concluding that Burke does not require nontaxabil-
ity of punitive damages because of the § 104(a)(2) requirement that the damages be received "on
account" of the personal injury).
285. Reese v. United States, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,447 (Cl. Ct. 1993).
286. As described above, ADEA and Equal Pay Act actions share certain remedial provisions
because they both incorporate remedial aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See supra notes
182, 208.
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be held sufficiently "tort-like?" If so, will back pay and liquidated damages
both be excludable or will back pay and liquidated damages be treated
differently?
As discussed earlier,2 87 there is pre-Burke authority for bifurcating the
ADEA and Equal Pay Act recoveries; that is, treating back pay amounts as
taxable and liquidated damages as excludable. Bifurcation appears ques-
tionable under the "nature of the claim" analysis applied by the Supreme
Court in Burke. Nevertheless, post-Burke decisions have split on the taxa-
bility of ADEA recoveries.
The Tax Court recently reaffirmed its pre-Burke holding288 that an
ADEA settlement award containing a fifty-fifty allocation to back pay and
liquidated damages is entirely excludable.289 Applying a broad interpreta-
tion of the "nature of the claim" test, the court held that the ADEA remedial
scheme evidences a tort-like conception of injury and remedy, and there-
fore, all damages received on account of the ADEA claim are excludable
from income.290 In contrast, a district court held that ADEA settlement
amounts are taxable, based upon the conclusion that the ADEA remedial
scheme is not sufficiently "tort-like" to come within the § 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion.291 The settlement award received by the claimant did not include any
amount allocated to liquidated damages. The court observed that availabil-
ity of liquidated damages under the ADEA did not "convert every ADEA
award into 'personal injury' damages for tax purposes. '2 92 The court's con-
clusion is based in part on the restrictive and somewhat questionable view
that ADEA liquidated damages merely substitute for a criminal penalty. A
287. See supra text accompanying notes 182-95.
288. See supra note 195.
289. Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 40, 1993 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 40 (June 29,
1993) [hereinafter Downey 11]; accord Rice v. United States, 93-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 50,488
(E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding ADEA back pay and liquidated damages excludable from income under
§ 104(a)(2)); see also Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 960 (5th Cir. 1993)
(applying Downey I1).
290. Downey II, 1993 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS at *9 (LEXIS pagination). The three separate
concurring and dissenting opinions in Downey 11 illustrate the range of other possible results: (1)
When the cause of action is for nonwillful age discrimination, for which liquidated damages are
not available, the back pay award is includable in income; however, when it is for willful discrimi-
nation, a "tort-like" conception of injury and remedy is present and thus both back pay and liqui-
dated damages are excludable, id. (Halpern, J., concurring, joined by Whalen and Beghe, JJ.). (2)
Bifurcating the claim for willful violation of the ADEA into tort and contract claims, and conclud-
ing that liquidated damages are excludable tort damages and that back pay is includable as dam-
ages for breach of contract. Id. at *22 (Laro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Jacobs, J.). (3) Agreeing with Judge Laro's conclusion, but deferring to the majority's result
because Burke does not provide a "clear-cut reason for changing the result in Downey I" and
because all other authorities support petitioners' position of excluding such damages. Id. at *9
(Cohen, J., concurring in the result).
291. Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 1553, 1556-57 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
292. Id. at 1557.
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more expansive view of liquidated damages leads to results contrary to the
district court's decision. For example, some courts understand liquidated
damages to serve as compensation for intangible elements of injury caused
by discrimination, as well as a deterrent to and punishment for violations.293
If courts instead look to the specific type of ADEA claim asserted by
the plaintiff, the tax results may depend upon the theory of the case. Thus,
for example, taxability of ADEA recoveries may depend upon whether the
recovery is obtained pursuant to a disparate impact2 94 or disparate treatment
theory, and back pay awards may have to be allocated based upon the the-
ory of recovery. The EEOC, the agency charged with enforcement of the
ADEA, initially took the position that all disparate treatment awards under
the ADEA are nontaxable.295 It took no position on disparate impact
claims.2 96 It reversed itself on disparate treatment claims, however, after
consultation with the Service. The EEOC then stated that both back pay
and liquidated damages are taxable.297
293. See Bennett v. United States, Nos. 92-216T, 92-213T, 92-214T, 92-218T, 1994 U.S.
Claims LEXIS *5 (Cl. Ct. Jan. 5, 1994, as amended Feb. 4, 1994) (criticizing Maleszeivski and
holding that both liquidated damages and back pay received in settlement of ADEA claims are
excludable from income under § 104(a)(2)); see, e.g., Downey II, 100 T.C. at *7 (discussing the
nature of ADEA liquidated damages); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 172 (1991).
294. The Supreme Court has never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is
available under the ADEA. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993);
Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Although there is some debate as to whether the disparate impact theory developed in the context
of Title VII applies to the ADEA, most appellate courts have either assumed its applicability or
expressly applied it. E.g., EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984);
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981). See
generally Sc-LEi & GRossMAN, supra note 117, at 503-04 & FivE-YEAR CUMULATIVE SuPPM-
MENT, supra note 117, at 198-200 (collecting cases);.
295. The EEOC Office of General Counsel reversed its position on the taxability of ADEA
relief. It first decided that monetary relief for disparate treatment actions under the ADEA is
excludable under § 104(a)(2):
ADEA claims fall somewhere between claims under the unamended Title VII and
claims under section 1981. OGC will take the view, however, that under the Burke
analysis, an ADEA claim is [a] "personal injury" claim. First, unlike Title VII plain-
tiffs before the amendments, ADEA plaintiffs are entitled to jury trials. Secondly,
although the ADEA does not provide the full range of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages available under section 1981, plaintiffs may recover liquidated damages in addition
to the back pay available under Title VII. Thus the ADEA comes much closer than Title
VII does to compensating plaintiffs for "other traditional harms associated with personal
injury."
EEOC General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 269, at E-1 (quoting Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873).
296. Id.
297. After receiving advice from the Internal Revenue Commissioner, the EEOC issued a
revised position, rescinding the earlier guidance and concluding that back pay and liquidated dam-
age awards under the ADEA are to be regarded as taxable income:
OGC will take the position that backpay and liquidated damages under the ADEA are
not awards based upon tort or tort-like rights and are not excludable from income under
section 104(a)(2) ....
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G. Conclusion: The "Tort-Like" Standard Should Be Discarded
The foregoing sampling of post-Burke issues illustrates the potential
for extremely technical and seemingly inconsistent results depending upon
the statutory claim, the theory of relief asserted, and the type of damages
received.298
Some of these issues are unavoidable because they are relevaht to the
issue of whether the recovery constitutes damages on account of a "per-
sonal" injury under the "nature of the claim" analysis. Nevertheless, the
"tort-like" standard applied by the Court in Burke necessitates the resolu-
tion of issues which appear quite divorced from the underlying policies and
design of the anti-discrimination statutes. The civil rights statutes provide
protections and obligations apart from and independent of state tort law and
of the parties' contractual relationships, if any. The "tort-like" standard
forces lower courts to decide whether a particular federal civil rights claim
is more tort-like or contract-like based upon that particular statute's reme-
dial scheme, when neither a contract nor a tort label fits.
Justice Souter's opinion in Burke299 illustrates the dilemma. He ac-
knowledged good reasons for placing Title VII on either side of the line
dividing tort and contract actions.3"° He then removed himself from the
dilemma by concluding that when application of the exclusion is unclear,
the exclusion should be denied.30 Relying on the tort-like standard thus
leads either to doubtful and conflicting results or to an artificial consistency
mandated by the presumption of taxability when application of the exclu-
sion is unclear.
Justice Scalia was the only member of the Court to reject the standard
itself.3 02 His alternative approach to the problem of defining a "personal"
injury-applying a physical injury standard-leads to its own set of
problems and technicalities, however. First, his "common sense" statutory
construction is difficult to reconcile with the historical treatment of recov-
eries for nonphysical injuries during a period contemporaneous with the
earliest version of § 104(a)(2).3 °3 Second, although the government had at
Damages UnderAge Bias Act are Taxable, supra note 269, at G-11 (quoting from revised EEOC
memorandum dated March 1, 1993).
298. See generally ROBERT W. WOOD, TAxATIoN OF DAMAGE AwARDs AND SarLsmENT
PAYMENTS 3.1-3.47 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the tax treatment of discrimination and
other employee recoveries); Andrews, supra note 118 (discussing the effects of Burke on exclud-
ability under § 104(a)(2)); Richard T. Helleloid & Lucretia S.W. Mattson, Has the Scope of the
Personal Injury Exclusion Been Changed by the Supreme Court?, 77 J. TAx'N 82, 84-85 (1992)
(discussing post-Burke tax planning issues).
299. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1877 (1989) (Souter, I., concurring).
300. Id. at 1877-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
301. Id. at 1878 (Souter, J., concurring).
302. Id. at 1875-76 (Souter, J., concurring).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
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one time asserted the distinction between physical and nonphysical injuries
for purposes of § 104(a)(2), it had abandoned that argument by the time the
Burke case reached the Court.3" Finally, the physical injury standard is
bound to create artificial distinctions between employment discrimination
recoveries when the claimant can show some physical manifestation and
those when there is no record of medical treatment for stress-related symp-
toms. Like the category of punitive damages for nonphysical injuries,
which are expressly excepted from the application of § 104(a)(2), taxability
would turn on how much of a physical manifestation suffices to be treated
as physical injuries. Well-informed plaintiffs' attorneys would likely ad-
vise their clients to seek medical treatment for stress caused by discrimina-
tion, putting a premium on good, early legal advice and penalizing those
who suffer without medical evidence of their symptoms.
In sum, both the "tort-like" standard and the physical injury standard
should be rejected. Not only are they fraught with practical problems in
application, but they also apply § 104(a)(2) too restrictively given its theo-
retical justification. The "tort-like" standard should be replaced by a rule
that recognizes the effect of discrimination on human capital accumulation.
Part IV of this Article develops that alternative approach.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The "tort-like" standard should be replaced with an alternative human
capital approach. Under this approach, employment discrimination,
whether actionable under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, the Equal Pay
Act, or under § 1981 or § 1983, would qualify per se as a "personal" injury,
and recoveries under such statutes would be excludable under § 104(a)(2)
to the extent they compensate for such injury. As discussed above, the loss
of human capital suffered by victims of employment discrimination and the
"nature of the claims ' asserted are by their very nature "personal. 305
There is no "business" asset at issue for victims of discrimination apart
from their person and their status as an employee. They cannot transfer
their human capital apart from providing their services to an employer. As
compensation for human capital loss, employment discrimination recov-
eries should be excluded under § 104(a)(2) as damages received "on ac-
count" of personal injuries. This approach offers two key advantages: (1)
it is consistent with the theoretical justification for § 104(a)(2), and (2) it is
304. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, supra note 219, at 10 n.7 ("[The Service] no longer contends that only physical injuries
are encompassed within Section 104. Instead, the focus of the inquiry is whether the nature of the
recovery for a claim of nonphysical injury compensates for a personal loss or represents an eco-
nomic gain.").
305. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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administratively much easier to apply because it provides a bright-line rule
that is consistent with the tax treatment of personal tort recoveries.
As discussed in Part II, § 104(a)(2) can be understood as generally
comporting with the Code's treatment of human capital, which is quite dif-
ferent from its treatment of investment capital.30 6 Under such a view of
§ 104(a)(2), personal injury recoveries for lost past earnings are treated as
compensation for loss of human capital. If the injury had never occurred,
the earnings would have been subject to tax when realized in the form of
wages. If personal injury recoveries for past earnings are excluded from
income, as they are under current application of § 104(a)(2), the amount of
any such recovery should be computed on an after-tax basis, compensating
the victim for an amount net of the taxes that otherwise would have been
due on the wages received. Conversely, if § 104(a)(2) were repealed, such
recoveries should be computed on a before-tax basis and then made subject
to tax. Under either approach, the bottom-line results to the claimant are
the same, except in the context of settlement.30 7
Personal injury recoveries for future earnings are more complicated
because they may be paid on a periodic basis to replace putative future
earnings, or alternatively, paid as a lump sum equal to the present value of
the future earnings stream.3 °8 Section 104(a)(2) should ensure in either
306. See supra text accompanying notes 36-56, 71-93.
307. If the recoveries are nontaxable, more will be received by the claimant in settlement. As
a result, the Burke case will probably have its most direct effect in the context of settlement.
Characterized as wages rather than as a personal injury recovery, see supra note 232, any settle-
ment amounts would be included in the claimant's gross income and subject to both the withhold-
ing of the employee's portion of tax and the additional liability for the employer's employment
taxes. See generally Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 940 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding, in pre-Burke decision, that age discrimination settlement amounts are excludable from
gross income and thus not subject to federal, state, or FICA withholding taxes). Taxes can reduce
the amount available for settlement and payable to the claimant by one-third or more, making
settlement less likely. It is therefore very much in both parties' interest to characterize the pay-
ment, to the extent possible, as a recovery for nontaxable compensatory damages under the
amended civil rights statute or for personal injuries under traditional tort claims. See, e.g., An-
drews, supra note 118, at 776-83; Richard T. Helleloid & Joanne H. Turner, Tax Status of Em-
ployment Discrimination Awards and Settlements, 15 REv. TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS, 127, 142-48
(1991); Margaret Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and
Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAx LAw. 783, 804 (1992); Robert W. Wood, Taxing Discrimi-
nation Recoveries: Bucking Burke, 56 TAX NoTs 363, 366-67 (1992).
308. Unless special circumstances apply, the investment income on the personal injury recov-
ery itself will be taxed. Thus, for example, interest income on a lump sum personal injury award
is generally includable in income. E.g., Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124, 130 (1993) (con-
cluding that interest on wrongful death damages is not excludable under § 104(a)(2)).
The Code recognizes a limited exception for a narrow class of "structured settlements" under
§ 130. In a typical structured settlement, a plaintiff's personal injury claim is settled under an
agreement in which the defendant agrees to make a series of periodic payments to the plaintiff for
a fixed period or for the life of the plaintiff. In the settlement agreement, the defendant may agree
to purchase a nonassignable, noncancelable annuity from a life insurance company, the income
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case that the amounts received replace the after-tax earning stream that the
victim would have received if the injury had not occurred. 309 If § 104(a)(2)
were repealed, the amounts might instead be taxed like investment capital:
once when the lump sum is received and again when the earnings are re-
ceived. 10 Under such a regime, a personal injury victim would receive less
than an equivalent earnings stream because the human capital that the lump
sum replaces ordinarily would not be subject to taxation until realized in the
form of earnings produced by such capital.
Reasonable policymakers could disagree about whether personal injury
recoveries should be treated as an income realization and recognition event.
Arguably, some personal injury recoveries represent a conversion of human
capital into investment capital, and thus, they should be taxed like invest-
ment capital. Congress long ago determined, however, that personal injury
recoveries are not includable in income, perhaps in part due to the involun-
tariness of the injury and the understanding that such recoveries compensate
for human capital loss. That result can be defended today, even under our
more developed ideas of what constitutes "income.
311
Given such a judgment (or simply the continued existence of
§ 104(a)(2) through inaction), the exclusion ought to apply to employment
from which is used to make the periodic payments. Alternatively, the defendant may make a
payment to a third party, a "qualified assignee," who agrees to assume the payment liability in a
"qualified assignment" under § 130.
A qualified assignment under § 130 "means any assignment of liability to make periodic
payments as damages" on account of personal injury in cases involving physical injury or physical
sickness, provided the terms of the assignment satisfy four requirements, including: (1) the peri-
odic payments are fixed as to amount and time; (2) the payments cannot be accelerated, deferred,
increased, or decreased by the recipient; (3) the assignee's obligation is no greater than that of the
person assigning the liability; and (4) the payments are excludable to the recipient as damages
under § 104(a)(2). I.R.C. § 130 (West Supp. 1993).
The limitation on the application of § 130 structured settlements to physical injuries or sick-
ness was added by Congress in 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1002(a), 100 Stat. 2388 (1986).
Because the insurer or defendant owns the annuity, the claimant in a structured settlement does
not actually or constructively receive the amount used to fund the settlement by the insurance
company and therefore is not taxed on the income generated by the annuity. The periodic pay-
ments are excluded from the income of the claimant under § 104(a)(2).
Not taxing the investment income in structured settlements under § 130 has been criticized as
inconsistent with the proper taxation of economically accrued interest. E.g., Blackburn, supra
note 62, at 690. On the other hand, not taxing the interest has been defended on the theory that
such amounts represent imputed income (the benefit of physical wholeness) from a replacement of
bodily human capital, and as such, should be excluded. See Brooks, supra note 64, at 773. Pro-
fessor Dodge has criticized that imputed income rationale. See Dodge, supra note 64, at 152-53.
Nevertheless, he justifies the § 130 result as appropriate, provided that a before-tax discount rate
is used to compute the putative lump sum recovery (the annuity purchase price). By reducing the
recovery (or the amount available to purchase an annuity), the before-tax discount rate implicitly
taxes the income portion of the annuity. Dodge, supra note 44, at 159.
309. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
310. Dodge, supra note 44, at 177.
311. Id. at 155-67.
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discrimination awards because they are recoveries for injury to human capi-
tal, which is at the very core of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. In the employ-
ment context, such a claim is by definition "personal" in nature.
Assuming the § 104(a)(2) exclusion continues, employment discrimi-
nation recoveries should be treated the way other personal injury recoveries
are treated: they should be excluded from income to the extent they com-
pensate for human capital loss. Accordingly, recoveries measured by lost
past or future income (economic recoveries) should be computed on an af-
ter-tax basis; that is, reflecting what the claimant would have otherwise
earned but for the discrimination, minus taxes. Such a result would com-
port with the compensatory remedial policy of federal antidiscrimination
statutes. In addition, it would make the amount of compensatory relief,
which is appropriately determined in the context of the civil rights case
itself, a matter for the court considering the substantive claim.
Recoveries other than lost earnings raise different issues. Whatever
the correct result from a theoretical point of view for damages such as pain
and suffering, they should be treated consistently with their treatment in the
tort context. Although an argument can be made for including damages for
pain and suffering in the tort victim's income, they are currently excludable
under § 104(a)(2). For administrative reasons, employment discrimination
recoveries should be treated no differently. Punitive damages, which are
noncompensatory, should be includable in income regardless of how they
are treated in the tort context due to the lack of comparable administrative
considerations.
A. Ensuring the "Correct" Computation of Recoveries for Lost
Earnings: Economic Recoveries
If the purpose of § 104(a)(2) is to leave the taxpayer in the same eco-
nomic position as if the personal injury had never occurred, that is, taxing
any income from the victim's human capital only once, then the correct
result for tax purposes depends in part on how the damages are com-
puted.312 An examination of the computation of damages under substantive
312. For example, suppose Jane, who wanted to become an airplane mechanic, makes $12,000
a year as a fast-food worker. See supra Joe and Jane example in text accompanying notes 51-56.
Jane's male counterpart, John, see supra note 130, who graduated with her from vocational
school, makes $25,000 a year as an airplane mechanic. Under Title VII, Jane may be entitled to
recover the difference between what she could have made as an airplane mechanic ($25,000) and
what she made as a fast-food worker ($12,000), or $13,000. Theoretically, the recovery of
$13,000 for back pay should be taxed once, just as the $12,000 she made as a fast-food worker
was taxed once. Given § 104(a)(2), the Title VII recovery should be computed net of taxes. If
§ 104(a)(2) were repealed, the recovery should be computed on a gross basis, that is, before taxes.
Jane should be indifferent as to whether § 104(a)(2) is repealed.
If she then is hired as a result of the Title VII action, her future salary should reflect her
earnings as a mechanic. Thus, prospective injunctive relief can eliminate the need for future pay
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tort law reveals conflicting views concerning the role of taxes in the compu-
tation of lost earnings. After summarizing those views, the Article turns to
a more detailed consideration of how employment discrimination back pay
and front pay awards ought to be computed, and whether after-tax computa-
tion of employment discrimination recoveries is feasible.
1. Background: Computation of Tort Recoveries
For most garden-variety personal injury claims, the role that taxability
plays in the computation of tort damages depends upon vagaries of state
law. States are divided on the issue of whether the defendant may introduce
evidence concerning the taxes that would have been due on lost past or
future earnings and whether the jury may be instructed that any award for
lost earnings would be excluded from the gross income of the recipient.313
Those states that refuse to reduce a recovery for taxes sometimes base that
rule on the speculative nature of computing taxes on future income in situa-
tions where the determination of future income is already complex and in-
exact. Regardless of whether the state tort damages are computed on a
before or after-tax basis, the lost past or future earnings remain nontaxable
adjustments. If, on the other hand, instatement is not ordered, front pay may be awarded. Front
pay awards require a more complex analysis because of the need to discount a future income
stream to its present value. See supra note 75. To avoid taxing such amounts twice, the proper
discount rate must be applied to the properly computed wages to determine the present value of
the future wage stream. See supra notes 83-84.
In contrast, Joe, the investor in the original example, makes investments with after-tax dollars
and is also subject to tax on the income from his investment.
313. See, e.g., John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax Into Considera-
tion in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Action, 16 A.L.R. 4th 589 (1982 & Supp.
1992). See also REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 914A (1977) (ignoring taxes generally).
For example, in California, it is permissible for a trial judge not to instruct the jury as to the tax
consequences of damage awards arising from personal injury. See Henninger v. Southern Pacific
Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 872, 879 (1967); accord Mackey v. Campbell Constr. Co., 101 Cal. App.
3d 774, 789 (1980). In addition, it has been held that the introduction of evidence of future tax
consequences affecting the amount of an award in a personal injury action would "open the door
to intense speculation about the future on part of the jury," and thus, damages for loss of future
income are computed on a gross income rather than an after-tax net income basis. Rodriquez v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 667 (1978). In New York, the highest court has
held that the better practice in all cases in which jury awards are excluded from taxation is for the
jury to be instructed that such awards, if any, are not subject to income taxes. Lanzano v. City of
New York, 519 N.E.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. 1988). The jury should be further instructed not to add or
subtract from the award on account of taxes, but to follow ordinary specific instructions for mea-
suring damages. Id. at 331. Under these instructions, "taxes are treated for what they are in this
area-a speculative and irrelevant nonfactor." Id. at 332. Some other states permit damages to be
computed on an after-tax basis. See Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967) (holding
that deduction for taxes should be made for award of lost earnings); Floyd v. Fruit Indus. Inc., 136
A.2d 918, 925-26 (Conn. 1957) (requiring award of lost future earnings to be computed on a net
after-tax basis).
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for federal income tax purposes. State variations in the computation of re-
coveries thus are not reflected in application of the federal exclusion.
314
In contrast, federal law has been applied in a more uniform manner. In
what has been characterized as a "federal common law rule," in actions for
wrongful death arising under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA)
and certain other federal law claims when the measure of damages is a
question of federal law, the Supreme Court has held that federal income tax
should be considered in determining a claimant's lost earnings and, upon
request, the jury must be instructed on the tax-exempt nature of the award
under § 104(a)(2) of the Code.315 In so holding, the Court implicitly re-
jected arguments, which were well articulated by the dissent, that the prob-
able purpose of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion was (1) to create a federal rule,
similar to the rule adopted by some states, that income taxes should not be
taken into account in computing a personal injury award because of the
complexities and uncertainties involved; or (2) to confer a humanitarian
benefit on the victim or victims of the tort, not to confer a tax benefit on the
tortfeasor.3 6
The federal approach to the computation of damages on an after-tax
basis is based upon the compensatory purpose of personal injury or wrong-
314. For the suggestion that federal tax law should instead respond to the state's method of
computing tort damages, see discussion of Dodge proposal supra in text accompanying notes
72-88. Arguably, claimants in states that do not compute damages for lost income on an after-tax
basis get an extra benefit when the § 104(a)(2) exclusion is applied for income tax purposes. See
Dodge, supra note 44, at 165. On the other hand, the exclusion perhaps ought to apply when
personal injury damages are computed in a much more approximate way; i.e., when the tax conse-
quences are viewed either as relatively inconsequential or as otherwise subsumed in the overall
methodology applied to compute damages. Such states may be viewed as computing damages
without considering taxes at all rather than expressly deciding to make the computation on a
before-tax basis.
315. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-94 (1980) (holding that in wrongful
death action under FELA when the measure of recovery is the damages flowing from the "depri-
vation of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might have reasonably received," the
wage earner's after-tax income is the proper measure of monetary loss suffered by his dependents
when he dies); see Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 488 (1981) (remanding
for consideration of whether state law requires jury instruction that damage awards are not subject
to federal income tax, and if it does, whether "federal common-law rule generally applicable to
federal damages actions" established in Liepelt for FELA cases displaces state rule in action under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act); see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462
U.S. 523, 533-38 (1983) (computing lump-sum damages for lost income in personal injury action
under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act on the basis of after-tax wages
and benefits, and proposing that the discount rate used to compute the present value of the future
stream of lost income should "represent the after-tax rate of return to the injured worker"). But cf.
Dodge, supra note 44, at 156-60, 160 n.92 (arguing that an after-tax discount rate should be used
only if the annuity income on the lump sum would be taxed).
316. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 500-02 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the computation of
personal injury damages on an after-tax basis transfers the tax benefit to the tortfeasor, making the
tortfeasor better off by paying the damages rather than paying the wages directly).
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ful death damages and the applicability of the exclusion under § 104(a)(2).
Recoveries for personal injury actions calculated under federal law thus
view compensation for injury as computed on an after-tax basis, subtracting
the taxes from the amounts the victim would otherwise have earned,
thereby lessening the amounts the tortfeasor otherwise would have paid. 17
Because the injured party has already been subject to an implicit tax, requir-
ing an explicit tax upon payment by the tortfeasor would undercompensate
the victim. In this context, therefore, the § 104(a)(2) exclusion results in
the correct answer.
2. Computation of Back Pay Awards
Recovery for economic injuries resulting from employment discrimi-
nation generally means an award of back pay, and sometimes, front pay (in
lieu of promotion or reinstatement).318 Courts awarding lost pay in employ-
ment discrimination cases have generally been responsive to the applicable
federal tax rule.319 Until the 1980s, back pay was generally viewed as taxa-
ble; that is, subject to employment taxes as wages and includable in the
recipient's income. For the most part, therefore, back pay was computed on
a before-tax or gross basis.320 When the appellate courts began applying
317. When the government is the tortfeasor, the fisc suffers no real loss. When a private
employer pays damages minus the taxes, however, the government suffers a revenue loss from the
after-tax computation method.
318. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. Economic recoveries could also include
compensatory damages for medical expenses and other out-of-pocket costs incurred as a result of
the discrimination. Generally speaking, back pay or front pay is awarded as a lump sum, rather
than as periodic payments.
319. After United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992), presumably courts will compute
any pre-amendment lost earnings on a before-tax or gross basis. Much uncertainty remains, how-
ever, regarding the taxation of post-amendment back pay awards. For example, if post-Burke tax
decisions treat back pay received under a disparate impact claim as taxable, and back pay received
under a disparate treatment claim as nontaxable, the correct back pay computation would be to
award disparate impact back pay on a before-tax basis, and disparate treatment back pay on an
after-tax basis. On the other hand, if all back pay awards are held nontaxable, they should be
computed on an after-tax basis.
Where the tax treatment of post-amendment back pay awards is uncertain, back pay should
be computed on a before-tax basis. Otherwise, the victims of discrimination could be subject to a
double tax: once in the form of an implicit tax when lost earnings are computed on an after-tax or
net basis, and again in the form of an explicit tax if § 104(a)(2) is held to be inapplicable. That
result would conflict with the "make whole" purpose of back pay awards. Until there is a clear tax
rule (or one that is responsive to the computation of the damage award, as has been suggested in
the state tort context), the correct computation of most employment discrimination recoveries
remains unclear. Until the issues under § 104(a)(2) are resolved, courts should resolve any uncer-
tainty in favor of the victim of discrimination when computing awards.
320. E.g., Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1579-80 (5th Cir.
1989) (allowing the trial court to account for the plaintiff's tax liability in a nontaxable personal
injury award but refusing to require such accounting in a taxable back pay award), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1019 (1990); see also United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 747 F. Supp.
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the "nature of the claim" test to employment discrimination recoveries, and
finding them excludable from income under § 104(a)(2), some courts re-
sponded by taking taxes into account in the computation of back pay
awards in employment discrimination cases and computing back pay on an
after-tax basis (net of taxes).32'
Under the alternative proposal suggested above, employment discrimi-
nation awards would be excluded from income under § 104(a)(2). Given
excludability from income, awards for lost earnings should be computed on
an after-tax basis. The responsiveness of courts to the federal income tax
treatment of back pay awards suggests that the proposal could be imple-
mented without legislative changes. However, the correct result depends
upon judicial adoption of the approach urged here.
Although courts generally have responded to the tax status of back pay
awards in computing the amount of the award, some courts granting relief
in employment discrimination cases have resisted making adjustments to
back pay awards. Faced with other types of adjustments, they have referred
to case law in which back pay awards have not been reduced to take ac-
count of unemployment compensation benefits received during the back
pay period, for example,322 or relied on the notion that back pay need not be
computed with unrealistic exactitude.3" Those concerns may affect the af-
1370, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (calculating interest on back pay award based on gross back pay
owed rather than on an after-tax amount).
321. E.g., Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 960 (5th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing in an ADEA case, after applying Downey II, 100 T.C. No. 40, that the lost earnings award was
properly computed net of taxes); Robinson v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., No. 87-5114,
1991 WL 78257 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 1991) (reducing Title VII gross back pay award by the amount
of federal income taxes that would have been withheld if received as wages, relying on the Third
Circuit's opinion in Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 663-64 (3d Cir. 1990), that back pay
awards for age discrimination are excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2)), rev'd, 982
F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that, in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision
in Burke, the effect of the trial judge's ruling was to tax Robinson twice); Beilan v. Sun Co., Inc.,
No. 88-3085, 1990 WL 106581, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1990) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that
the victim of age discrimination, and not the perpetrator, should receive the windfall that results
from non-taxability of ADEA back pay awards: "The defendant, far from receiving a windfall, is
required to pay plaintiff an amount equal to after tax wages without ever receiving the benefit of
any services from plaintiff.").
322. Courts are split on whether unemployment compensation should be deducted from a re-
covery of back pay under Title VII or the ADEA. It is sometimes left to the discretion of the trier
of fact. Where courts have denied the offset, the result has often been justified on the basis of the
collateral source rule-that benefits received by an injured party from a source independent of the
wrongdoer should not be deducted from the damages paid the injured party. See, e.g., Glenn A.
Guarino, Annotation, Offsetting Unemployment Benefits Received Against Award for Backpay in
Employment Discrimination Actions, 66 A.L.R. Fed. 880 (1984 & Supp. 1993) (collecting cases).
323. Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 627 (6th Cir. 1983) (con-
cluding that "backpay awards should not be reduced by the amount of income and social security
taxes which would have been deducted from the wages the claimant would have received but for
the discrimination"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984).
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ter-tax computation of back pay when the computation is itself an inexact
process.
The degree of exactitude achievable in the computation of back pay
awards varies with the type of discrimination claim asserted. For individual
claims involving back pay and no front pay, the after-tax amount could be
computed by the trier of fact with a relatively high degree of accuracy. If
the trier of fact does not compute the award on an after-tax basis, my propo-
sal results in overcompensation of the victim of discrimination, an incorrect
result. That result is more tolerable, however, than the undercompensation
that could occur under Burke,324 particularly given the goals of Title VII
and the limited way in which back pay compensates for human capital loss.
For class action claims involving aggregate back pay awards or aggre-
gate front pay,32 ' determining the appropriate amount of any remedial
award is more difficult. The computation of class relief may involve the
use of various assumptions and statistical models, in which taxes would be
another variable in a process necessarily dependent upon approxima-
tions.326 Deciding how to take taxes into account for purposes of fashion-
ing relief in the aggregate claim context should arguably be within the
discretion of the court.327 Consistent with the compensatory purposes of
Title VII, any doubt regarding the appropriate reduction for taxes should be
resolved in favor of the victim of discrimination.
328
324. Undercompensation of the victim of discrimination could occur under United States v.
Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992), if the trier of fact computes the back pay award on an after-tax
basis, and the award is included in income. See supra note 321.
325. The computation of front pay requires a present value computation-applying an appro-
priate discount rate to a future stream of income. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text
for a description of tax considerations applying to such a computation.
326. Title VII back pay awards have been approved on the basis of average damages for a
class of claimants. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260-63 (5th Cir.
1974). Two principles are sometimes applied: (1) "unrealistic exactitude is not required," and (2)
uncertainties "should be resolved against the discriminating employer." Id. at 260-61. The com-
bination of a large class, ambiguity of employment practices or policies, or multiple effects of
discriminatory practices may result in the necessity of applying a class-wide approach to measur-
ing back pay, a process involving a "quagmire of hypothetical judgments." Id. at 260; see also,
e.g., Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1275-79 (10th Cir. 1988) (ordering district court
to devise a new remedy, but affirming the use of a class-wide remedy); Bowe v. Colgate,
Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973) (affirming the use of a test period for computation of
class-wide back pay awards in sex discrimination case).
327. Cf Sears v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., 749 F.2d 1451, 1451 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that district court did not abuse discretion by including a "tax component in back pay
award to compensate class members for their additional tax liability as a result of receiving over
17 years of back pay in one lump sum"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985).
328. Assuming that an accurate amount of front pay could be computed, the present value
calculation should be informed by the principles set forth supra in notes 57-94 and accompanying
text. Front pay awards ordinarily would be received as a lump sum amount. Such an award may
be viewed as a nontaxable replacement of future earnings under § 104(a)(2). Thus, the amount
should be calculated on an after-tax basis and the lump sum excluded from income.
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The excludability of employment discrimination recoveries under
§ 104(a)(2) results in certain administrative advantages. Uniform tax treat-
ment of tort and employment discrimination recoveries would make tax
planning less important for employment discrimination litigators and would
make allocation of damages for settlement purposes less subject to
manipulation.329
In sum, once the judgment has been made to treat personal injury
awards as nonrealization or nonrecognition events, employment discrimina-
tion recoveries for lost earnings should be treated consistently with tort re-
coveries for lost earnings. Employment discrimination also injures human
capital; back pay and front pay compensate for the opportunities and bene-
fits lost as a result of such discrimination. If such recoveries are excluded
from gross income, they should be computed on an after-tax basis when the
relief is provided for the substantive violation. How the adjustment for
taxes is made is best determined at the time relief is fashioned by trier of
fact in its effort to make the victim "whole." On the other hand, if
§ 104(a)(2) were repealed, then employment discrimination recoveries for
lost earnings must be computed on a before-tax basis and included in the
gross income of the recipient.
B. Noneconomic Injuries: Policy Choices and Practicalities
1. Emotional and Dignitary Harms
Employment discrimination also results in personal emotional and dig-
nitary harms, which can be labeled as noneconomic injury. The label is not
entirely apt, given the ability of factfinders to assign an economic value to
such injury. Nevertheless, the term "noneconomic" reflects a distinction
between "economic" recoveries, such as back pay awards and compensation
for certain out-of-pocket expenses, and those recoveries for which there is
no market analog. Noneconomic recoveries in the employment discrimina-
tion context include: (1) awards for pain and suffering and emotional dis-
tress under §§ 1981 and 1983, and (2) certain compensatory damages under
the amended remedial provisions applicable to claims of intentional dis-
crimination under Title VII and the ADA. Noneconomic recoveries may
also include liquidated damage awards under the ADEA and the Equal Pay
Act.3
30
329. See supra note 307.
330. Generally speaking, courts have viewed liquidated damages under the ADEA and the
Equal Pay Act as compensatory in nature, although they have been viewed as combining aspects
of compensatory and punitive functions. E.g., Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. No. 10 (1991)
(Downey 1) (discussing case law and concluding that liquidated damages compensate the victim of
age discrimination for certain nonpecuniary losses).
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Recoveries for dignitary harm (that is, for being treated not as an indi-
vidual but as a member of a subordinated or stigmatized group) compensate
the victim for loss of imputed income from human capital. Imputed income
(the pleasure or satisfaction derived from one's job or leisure time) is sim-
ply not accounted for in our current tax system.331 When the victim of
discrimination receives an award for emotional distress, however, what
would otherwise be imputed income has been transformed into cash, a mar-
ket transaction (analogous to leisure time being used to earn money), which
ought to be taxed. Theoretically, therefore, an argument can be made for
taxing monetary recoveries for such noneconomic recoveries as a kind of
windfall to the recipient.332 On the other hand, the recovery could be
thought of as a substitute for emotional or dignitary well-being, an element
of one's human capital that ought never be taxed, particularly when it has
been lost involuntarily.333
Recoveries for pain and suffering are excludable from gross income
under § 104(a)(2).334 Unless the rule is changed in the tort context,
noneconomic awards for employment discrimination should remain exclud-
able because of allocation and manipulation problems caused by an incon-
sistent rule applicable to tort and employment discrimination recoveries.
Furthermore, because this Article proposes that recoveries for lost earnings
also be excludable from income, no allocation between employment dis-
crimination economic (back pay) and compensatory noneconomic (emo-
tional distress) damages need be made by the trier of fact or by the parties
to a settlement agreement.
2. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are both noneconomic and noncompensatory. The
theoretical justification for exclusion of personal injury awards from gross
income under § 104(a)(2) does not apply to punitive damages. Rather than
compensate for human capital loss, punitive damages serve the quite differ-
ent policy goals of retribution and deterrence.
335
Punitive damages may be awarded under limited circumstances pursu-
ant to successful claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1983, and for claims of
intentional discrimination under Title VII and the ADA. They ordinarily
331. See supra text accompanying notes 38-48.
332. Dodge, supra note 44, at 182-87; Griffith, supra note 68, at 1130-35, 1153 (under a
utilitarian tax base, recoveries for pain and suffering are included in the base because they in-
crease the taxpayer's income without increased offsetting expenses).
333. See supra note 64.
334. See supra notes 1, 10.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 214-18,274-85 for a discussion of the pre-Burke and
post-Burke tax treatment of punitive damages.
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would be included in the recipient's gross income under § 104(a)(2) as pu-
nitive damages for nonphysical injuries.
Even if there were no such limit on the exclusion provided by
§ 104(a)(2), or if the injuries caused by employment discrimination had
some physical manifestation, the correct result would be inclusion in in-
come.336 Few problems of allocation in the settlement context would arise
from inclusion for punitive damages (when other categories of damages are
excludable) because defendants ordinarily would resist any allocation of
settlement amounts to punitive damages. 37 It would not be in the plain-
tiffs' interest to allocate a portion of the award to an includable amount, and
defendants would be loathe to admit the kind of behavior justifying a puni-
tive award. Therefore, few would be making an allocation to punitive dam-
ages in the settlement context. Any jury award for punitive damages would
be separately specified, and thus, the different tax treatment of punitive
damages would not pose administrative difficulties.
V. CONCLUSION
The "tort-like" standard applied by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Burke338 should be discarded in favor of an alternative human capital
approach, which is more consistent with the policy justification for
§ 104(a)(2) and the purposes of equal employment opportunity laws. The
Burke decision leaves many issues unresolved and applies a framework of
analysis bound to create more litigation concerning the tax treatment of
employment discrimination recoveries.
Post-Burke litigation is characterized by hypertechnical analysis of
statutory relief provisions to determine whether they are more tort-like or
contract-like in nature, an undertaking quite divorced from the policies
served by federal antidiscrimination statutes, which provide rights apart
from the tort or contract theories otherwise available to victims of discrimi-
nation. Post-Burke issues illustrate the difficulty of applying the tort-like
standard in this context. Unless the "nature of the claim" test is applied
quite broadly, application of the "tort-like" standard will result in some
back pay awards being treated as taxable and others as nontaxable. That
result conflicts with the compensatory purposes served by back pay awards.
Application of the standard also results in uncertainty. The lower courts
have already split on application of § 104(a)(2) to age discrimination recov-
336. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 44, at 180-81 ("As a matter of policy, there is little doubt
that punitive damages should be included in gross income."); Feinberg, supra note 215 passim
(arguing that Congress did not intend to exclude punitive damages for personal injuries from
income).
337. WooD, supra note 298, 2.61, at 2-10 (Supp. 1992).
338. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
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eries. Uncertainty regarding the tax rule creates corresponding uncertainty
regarding the correct computation of back pay awards.
Application of the human capital approach leads to a different analysis
than that applied in Burke. Although the bottom-line results to victims of
discrimination may differ in the context of settlement, the analysis proposed
here may not significantly affect the after-tax amount of back pay in most
cases reaching judgment, except when Burke results in double taxation.33 9
Nevertheless, the alternative approach treats various employment discrirni-
nation recoveries more uniformly and is more consistent with the tax treat-
ment of tort recoveries. That consistency has certain administrative
advantages as well as theoretical appeal.
Injuries suffered by victims of employment discrimination and by vic-
tims of personal torts affect an individual's human capital, and are thus
"personal" injuries. Section 104(a)(2) generally comports with the Code's
approach to the taxation of human capital. Under that approach, economic
recoveries for lost earnings are correctly excluded from income if computed
based on an after-tax wage stream. Recoveries for emotional distress and
pain and suffering are excluded from income under § 104(a)(2) and should
be treated no differently in the employment discrimination context. Puni-
tive damages, which do not compensate for human capital loss, should be
included in income. In addition to consistency and administrative advan-
tages, the human capital approach offers a theory more compatible with the
purposes of civil rights statutes and with tax policy.
339. See supra notes 319, 324.
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